Constructive Discharge Cases

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 expanding allegations on summary judgment disparate treatment sex discrimination hostile work environment constructive discharge appellant's burden on appeal App.R. 12(A)(2) App.R. 16(A)(7). It was appellant's burden, as the appellant, to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error in the record and to substantiate her arguments in support thereof. Appellant did not show that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, violation of public policy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant made no mention of her claims for violation of public policy or intentional infliction of emotional distress in her appellate brief. As to her remaining claims, while appellees met their burden under Civ.R. 56(C), presenting evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment based on the lack of evidence of essential elements of each of appellant's claims, appellant did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial on her claims. Appellant did not apply the applicable legal standards and did not show, based on evidence in the record, that a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of appellant on her sex discrimination, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge claims. Review of the record did not reveal any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of appellees.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant school district for her alleged constructive discharge from employment as a teacher. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately twenty-four years when she resigned from her position in August, 2019. On December 19, 2019, she filed an age discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). There- after, the CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), constructive discharge, and breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was seventy years old, claimed that she was forced to resign after the defendant created an intolerable work environment by marginalizing and unfairly criticizing her because it wanted to replace her with a younger teacher. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and, thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging only constructive discharge. In that complaint, the plaintiff added allegations related to a report issued by the defendant on June 10, 2019, in which it acknowledged that an assistant principal had copied certain portions of the plaintiff's prior evaluations into her 2016–2017 school year evaluation and recommended a review of adminis- trators' practices of referencing evaluations from prior years. The defen- dant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's complaint to the CHRO was untimely pursuant to the 180 day limitation period set forth in the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)), because the plaintiff had failed to identify conduct relating to an intolerable working environment that had persisted to June 22, 2019, o

The Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor and claiming constructive discharge. The Employer moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Plaintiff's employment agreement. The Plaintiff responded by invoking the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, which the trial court concluded invalidates the mandatory arbitration provision. We reverse the trial court's decision because the harassment of the Plaintiff and her constructive discharge occurred prior to the effective date of the Act.