Cummins South, Inc.

<p>Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered upon an order made ¡November 22, 1892, which, affirmed a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon an order dismissing the complaint on trial and also affirmed an order denying a motion for a new trial.</p> <p>This was a judgment creditor’s action brought by plaintiff, as administratrix of David Kain, deceased, to have adjudged and declared fraudulent and void as to her intestate, a transfer of certain real estate made by the defendant, Patrick Larkin, to his daughter, Mary E. Larkin, an infant.</p> <p>The material facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The sufficiency of a pleading cannot be raised for the first time in the Court of Appeals. It cannot consider a matter or subject that has not been presented by adjudication to, and determined by, the subordinate court. It has no power to review errors not pointed out by exceptions taken at a proper time. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 996, 1337; Hofheimer v, Campbell, 59 N. Y. 269; 271, 272 ; Delaney v. Brett. 51 id. 78, 82; S. O. Co. v. A. Ins. Co., 79 id. 506; Knapp v. Simon, 96 id. 291, 292; Duryea v. Vosburgh, 121 id. 57.) Under the liberal construction required to be given to a pleading by the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 519), the complaint sufficiently alleges that Patrick Larkin transferred, after the commencement of plaintiff’s suit on her lawful demand, the entire property, real and personal, of which he was the owner. (Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 330; Marie v. Garrison, 83 id. 23, 28 ; Sanders v. Soutter, 126 id. 196; Hale v. O. N. Bank, 49 id. 626; People v. Rider, 12 id. 433; Seeley v. Engell, 13 id. 548.) The cause of action set forth in the complaint is statutory, and the facts essential to the cause of action are alleged in the language of the statute. (Code Civ. Pro. § 1871; Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 103, 104; Ford v. Babcock, 2 Sandf. 518; R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 133 N. Y. 242; Knapp v. City of Brooklyn,