Case Details
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- appeal from master-in-equity determination
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Outcome
Appellate court affirmed the master-in-equity's determination that a right of first refusal (ROFR) in a contract between Crescent Homes SC, LLC and CJN, LLC was unenforceable, rejecting Crescent's arguments regarding justiciability, restraint on alienation, and application of the rule against perpetuities.
Excerpt
Crescent Homes SC, LLC (Crescent) appeals the master-in-equity's determination that a right of first refusal (ROFR) contained in a contract between Crescent and CJN, LLC was unenforceable. Crescent asserts that because no offer to purchase the property was pending at the time of the hearing, the master erred in finding the matter presented a justiciable controversy. It further maintains the master erred in finding the ROFR created an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of an interest in land based on the master's finding the ROFR lacked specific terms. Crescent also contends the master improperly refused to consider evidence of the conduct of the parties. Finally, Crescent argues the master should have addressed whether the ROFR violated the rule against perpetuities (RAP) and if the master determined the ROFR violated the RAP, reformed the ROFR. We affirm.
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