In the Matter of the Adoption of Minor Children, Dustin Hill v. Kimberly and Daniel Cortez and Arkansas Department of Human Services

Directed verdict; wage discrimination; Ohio's Equal Pay Act; R.C. 4111.17; age discrimination; disparate treatment; disparate impact; prima facie case; indirect evidence; R.C. 4112.02; de novo. Judgment affirmed. The trial court's grant of appellee's motion for directed verdict on appellant's wage- and age-discrimination claims was proper. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the employee wage compensation plan adopted by appellee is discriminatory and violates R.C. 4111.17 and 4112.02. When construing the facts most strongly in appellant's favor, we find that appellant did not meet his burden to establish the elements of his wage-discrimination claim or his age-discrimination claim. Appellant admitted that all of the vascular interventional radiologists with the same academic rank were paid the same base salary, failed to present evidence of adverse employment actions by appellee, and failed to present a statistically relevant analysis to prove that appellee's wage compensation plan caused an adverse impact on employees over 40.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, her former employer, for alleged discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender in violation of the applicable provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The plaintiff, who had been a finance manager at the defendant's car dealership, claimed that she had been paid less than male employees who performed the same job and that she had been subjected to mistreat- ment by four male managers, which included sporadic incidents of yelling. She further alleged that male employees made remarks in the workplace that were crude and demeaning to women. The plaintiff initially brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged that the defendant had violated the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq.). While the federal action was pending, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, in which she alleged violations of § 46a-60. The commission thereafter issued to the plaintiff a release of jurisdiction letter that authorized her to bring this action in the Superior Court. During the pendency of that action, the District Court rendered summary judgment for the defendant. The trial court then granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that the evidence she presented was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her hostile work environment claim. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that res judicata barred the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the statute of limitations for Equal Pay Act claims required her to litigate that claim before her gender discrimination claim, there was no genuine issue of materi