Martinoli v. Stamford Police Dept.
Case Details
- Judge(s)
- Elgo; Seeley; DiPentima
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- appeal
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Excerpt
The defendants appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming an award by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District of total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had retired from his position as a police officer in the Stamford Police Department in 1999, shortly after he was awarded permanent partial disability benefits, and he became temporarily totally disabled in 2015. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly failed to determine that the plaintiff should be entitled, at a maximum, to temporary total disability benefits calculated using the minimum compensation rate as of the plaintiff's 2015 date of incapacity. Held: The board properly upheld the commissioner's denial of the defendants' request for a finding that the temporary total disability compensation rate should be based on the fifty-two weeks of earnings prior to the plaintiff's date of incapacity, which would have resulted in a compensation rate of zero dollars, as in cases in which there is a gap of time between the date of the injury and the date of incapacity, the compensation rate must be calculated using the date of incapacity, and, accordingly, pursuant to statute (§ 31-310 (a)), the plaintiff's compensation rate must be based on the prevailing wages of Stamford police officers at the time of the plaintiff's date of incapacity. The board properly determined that the defendants' claim that they were entitled to a credit against a certain increased permanent partial impairment award for any temporary total disability benefits paid after the plaintiff's date of maximum medical improvement was not ripe for review, as the com- missioner had scheduled further hearings to address the issue of credits due to the defendants and further factual development was necessary prior to any review by the board or by this court. Argued September 18, 2025—officially released March 10, 2026
What This Ruling Means
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