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Raper v. Oliver House, LLC

N.C. Ct. App.December 5, 2006No. COA06-236Cited 22 times
Defendant WinOliver House, LLC

Case Details

Judge(s)
Tyson, Martin, Calabria
Status
Published
Procedural Posture
motion to compel arbitration denied by trial court; reversed on appeal

Related Laws

No specific laws identified for this ruling.

Outcome

Appellate court reversed trial court's denial of motion to compel arbitration, finding the arbitration clause was not unconscionable and was supported by competent evidence of voluntary agreement.

Excerpt

<bold>1. Civil Procedure — allowing untimely served affidavit — abuse of</bold> <bold>discretion standard</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence and wrongful death case by allowing and considering the untimely served affidavit of plaintiff over defendants' objection in a hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration because: (1) the trial court took such other action as the ends of justice required and proceeded with the hearing; and (2) the order did not specifically state the trial court relied upon plaintiff's late filed affidavit.</block_quote> <bold>2. Arbitration and Mediation — denial of motion to compel —</bold> <bold>unconscionability</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a negligence and wrongful death case by ruling the arbitration clause in a contract between defendant<page_number>Page 415</page_number> assisted living facility and plaintiff, decedent's "responsibile party" and executrix, was unconscionable based upon findings of fact wholly unsupported by any competent evidence and by denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration, because: (1) the trial court's finding that there was no independent negotiation on the terms of the contract or the arbitration agreement was not supported by any competent evidence; (2) plaintiff admitted she signed the agreement and stated she voluntarily entered into this agreement with the facility; (3) contrary to the trial court's finding, the use of a standardized form does not per se lead to unconscionability of the contract; (4) there was no evidence of lack of mutual agreement or inequality of bargaining power; (5) the agreement to arbitrate was prominently located on the last page of the contract in bold face type directly above plaintiff's signature; (6) the provisions of the agreement to arbitrate were mutual and apply equally to all parties; (7) the trial court's determination that the arbitration clause was unconscionable since

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