Adams v. HARRAH'S BOSSIER CITY INV. CO.

Buy and Sell Contract—Mineral Rights—Warranty Deed—Negligence—Breach of Contract—Statute of Limitations—Third Party—Cause of Action—Accrual Date. The Bells hired Orr Land Company LLC (Orr) and its employee Ellerman to represent them in selling their real property. Orr found a buyer and the Bells entered into a buy and sell contract with the buyer, which provided, as pertinent here, that the sale excluded all oil, gas, and mineral rights in the property. Orr then retained Land Title Guarantee Company (Land Title) to draft closing documents, including the warranty deed. In 2005 the Bells signed the warranty deed and sold the property to the buyer. The Bells didn't know that the warranty deed prepared by Land Title didn't contain any language reserving the Bells' mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. For over nine years, the Bells continued to receive the mineral owner's royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease on the property. In 2014 the lessee oil and gas company learned that the Bells didn't own the mineral rights, so it began sending the payments to the buyer. After that, the Bells discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. In 2016 the Bells filed this negligence and breach of contract action against defendants Land Title, Orr, and Ellerman. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bells' claims were untimely because the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Bells contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss because they sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish that the statute of limitations didn't begin to accrue on their claims until the oil and gas company ceased payment in September 2014, which is when they contended they discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights. A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years

<bold>Libel and Slander — Report of suspected child abuse — presumption of good</bold> <bold>faith — actual malice</bold> <block_quote> Although plaintiff-customer contends defendant-salesperson reported plaintiff's behavior of suspected child abuse or neglect to the Department of Social Services based on retaliatory motives, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on the slander per se claim because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7A-543 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-301</cross_reference>) imposes an affirmative duty for anyone with cause to suspect child abuse or neglect to report that conduct; (2) N.C.G.S. § 7A-550 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-309</cross_reference>) provides immunity from liability to those who act in accordance with the reporting statute and presumes the reporter's good faith; and (3) plaintiff did not meet her burden under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 301 to show defendant's bad faith or actual malice.</block_quote>