Robert H. Edwards v. Urosite Partners

Granting a motion to confirm an arbitration award and denying a motion to vacate the same award, the Court holds: the parties' contract and applicable law gave the arbitration panel authority to decide both substantive and procedural arbitrability questions. Judgment is entered confirming the award. Denying the defendant's special appearance because the Court has specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Applying the court's jurisdictional balance-shifting framework, the court holds that the defendant's removal notice, which pleaded more than five million dollars in controversy, satisfied the statutory jurisdictional threshold where plaintiff offered no rebutting evidence. The plaintiff's allegations that the former president's new company aided and abetted his breach of fiduciary duties satisfied the jurisdictional clause in Tex. Gov't Code Section 25A.004(b)(5). The petition's repeated allegations regarding misappropriation of sensitive business information invoked Section 25A.004(d)(4)'s jurisdictional clause, requiring that the suit relate to intellectual-property ownership or use, despite no standalone trade-secret misappropriation claim. This opinion addresses Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 33's definition of "responsible third party" and the meaning of "the harm for which recovery of damages is sought," as used therein. This Opinion addresses the enforcement of a mandatory Buy-Sell Option clause and its specific performance remedy after the Offeror tendered the requisite buy/sell notice and the Offeree failed to respond to the notice and claimed the Offeror violated the underlying Company Agreement. The Court ultimately finds the Offeror is entitled to specific performance from the Offeree under the Buy-Sell Option clause. The Court awards the Offeror attorneys' fees. Ruling after court-ordered Rule 166(g) briefing. Ruling that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief and, with respect to one defendant, that Plaintiffs take nothi

The plaintiff, Clifton Peasley (plaintiff or Peasley), appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his action for declaratory relief, which sought, inter alia, a decree that he was entitled to back pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine. In this respect, it was undisputed that before commencing the action for declaratory relief, the plaintiff had filed a grievance seeking back pay, which proceeding remained pending in arbitration. Peasley's efforts to compare the provisions of the Teachers' Tenure Act with the landmark antidiscrimination protections discussed in Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147 (R.I. 2014), was unavailing. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation from the defendant, who filed a counterclaim for breach of the parties' separation agreement, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff was in arrears on his obligation to pay unallocated alimony and child support. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint, the parties stipulated to the amount due on the counterclaim, and the trial court rendered judgment on the counter- claim in accordance with the parties' stipulation. The defendant subse- quently applied for, and was granted, a property execution on the con- tents of a storage unit rented in the name of the plaintiff's father, and filed a claim for a determination of interests in the disputed property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the plaintiff owned the contents of the storage unit but that a variety of items in the storage unit were exempt from property execution pursuant to statute (§ 52-352b). On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in determining, sua sponte, that certain property was statutorily exempt from execution; pursuant to the plain language of the applicable statute (§ 52-361b [d]), a judgment debtor may claim an exemption by returning a signed exemption claim form indicating the property claimed to be exempt, and because § 51-361b (d) makes clear that if a judgment debtor chooses to claim an exemption, the judgment debtor must return the exemption claim form, which the plaintiff here failed to do, the statutory procedures provided for in § 52- 361b (d), which provide for notice, a stay of the property execution and a hearing to determine the rights to the disputed property, were not triggered. 2. Even if the plaintiff could assert a claim of exemption over the levied property without filing the necessary form, the plaintiff failed to seek a determination that the property was exempt, and, thus, the trial court should not have exempted any of the items from execution because i

Mandamus, Sick Leave Benefits, Retirement, Termination, Ordinance, Taxpayer Standing, Clear Legal Right, Declaratory Relief

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court challenging an order issued by the trial court in connection with its denial of the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. Under the parties' separation agreement, which was incor- porated into the judgment of dissolution, the defendant was required to pay to the plaintiff, as child support, alimony, and/or property distribu- tion, certain percentages of the net income that he received from his employer in the form of cash bonuses and stock awards. In 2015, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for contempt, claiming that the defendant had failed to pay certain amounts required under the separa- tion agreement. The trial court issued an order in connection therewith, requiring that the annual amounts paid with respect to the defendant's bonus and stock funds be based on his effective tax rate from the prior year. The plaintiff filed another motion for contempt alleging, inter alia, that the defendant violated the dissolution judgment by deducting extra amounts from his bonus and stock payments for taxes that he did not actually pay. The defendant asserted that these amounts were properly deducted because his net proceeds were to be calculated using his marginal tax rate rather than his effective tax rate. After a four day hearing, during which neither of the parties ever mentioned the 2015 order, the trial court found that the defendant's noncompliance was not wilful, but it issued a remedial order that required that he reimburse the plaintiff for certain funds based on its conclusion that the term ''net,'' as used in the separation agreement, clearly and unambiguously did not contemplate the consideration of his net income to calculate the amount of his bonus and stock income that was subject to distribution to the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court's analysis underlying its conclusion that the meaning of the