People in interest of I.B.-R

Plaintiffs were formerly employed as truck drivers for JP Trucking, Inc. (JP Trucking). They filed a complaint alleging that JP Trucking failed to pay them time and a half as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order No. 31 (Wage Order). Following a bench trial, the trial court found for plaintiffs and awarded them damages. JP Trucking appealed, and another Court of Appeals division concluded it could not resolve the appeal without further factual findings. On remand, the trial court found that plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under FLSA's Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption. However, the trial court also found that because plaintiffs either did not drive out of state or their out-of-state driving was de minimis, they were not "interstate drivers" under the Wage Order. The court awarded plaintiffs damages under the Wage Order along with reasonable fees and costs. On appeal, JP Trucking contended that the trial court interpreted "interstate drivers" in the Wage Order too narrowly. FLSA sets federal minimum wage and overtime requirements for certain employees nationwide, while the Wage Order sets the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for Colorado employees who work in certain industries. The Wage Order provisions are largely patterned after FLSA, and the Wage Order exemption includes employees who are subject to the MCA exemption, which exempts from the foregoing requirements drivers who transport goods in interstate commerce. Here, the trial court's findings on limited remand established that plaintiffs are subject to the MCA exemption, and JP Trucking satisfied its burden of proving that it transported goods in interstate commerce. Accordingly, plaintiffs are exempted from overtime pay. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of JP Trucking and to vacate the damages award.

Claimant is a firefighter for the City and County of Denver (the City). In July 2013, he was diagnosed with cancer, and on July 24, 2013, he advised the City of his cancer diagnosis and asserted his belief that the melanoma was related to or caused by his work as a City firefighter. Claimant filed an application for hearing on October 6, 2017, seeking medical and temporary total disability benefits. The City admitted compensability, but asserted a statute of limitations defense, arguing that the claim was barred because claimant filed his application more than four years after learning of his melanoma and reporting it to the City. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) agreed with the City, and the claim was dismissed as time barred. On appeal, claimant contended that the Panel misinterpreted the applicable statute of limitations, CRS § 8-43-103(2). He argued that the City had adequate notice of his intent to pursue compensation through the Division of Workers' Compensation's (Division) assignment of a claim number to the case, the City's filing of certain forms, and his filing of several documents. CRS § 8-43-103(2) requires a claimant seeking workers' compensation to file a "notice claiming compensation" within two years of discovering the work-related nature of the claimant's injuries, or within three years if the claimant can establish a reasonable excuse for late filing and the employer suffered no prejudice as a result. The Division's assignment of a claim number does not satisfy a claimant's obligation to notify the Division and the employer of his or her intent to seek compensation, and none of the documents claimant points to specifies that claimant was seeking compensation as that term is defined in CRS § 8-43-103. Based on claimant's admission that he knew in 2013 that his firefighting duties may have caused his melanoma, he needed to file his claim by 2015 to comply with the two-year statute of limitations, or by 2016 if he could establis

A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, second degree kidnapping, and first degree sexual assault. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when the prosecutor removed R.P., a prospective Hispanic juror, from the venire. When a party raises a Batson challenge, the trial court must conduct a three-step analysis to assess the claim of racial discrimination. First, the opponent of the peremptory strike must allege a prima facie case showing that the striking party struck the prospective juror on the basis of race. Next, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for excusing the prospective juror. The opponent is then given the opportunity to rebut the striking party's explanation. Here, the prosecutor claimed concern with R.P.'s views that the criminal justice system disproportionately affects people of color and those with mental disabilities. In addressing the Batson challenge, the trial court did not explicitly evaluate the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking R.P. Instead, the court sua sponte offered two race-neutral reasons to justify striking R.P. The court also failed to recognize that the record refuted most of the prosecutor's proffered excuses. Thus, the trial court erred in denying the Batson challenge. The judgment of conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Nieto worked for Clark's Market, Inc. (the Market) and accrued vacation time pursuant to the vacation policy in the Market's employee handbook. The handbook stated that an employee is entitled to payment for accrued but unused vacation time if she voluntarily resigns and gives at least two weeks' notice, but if the Market discharges an employee for any reason or for no reason, or if the employee fails to give two weeks' notice before quitting, the employee forfeits all earned vacation pay benefits. The Market discharged Nieto and refused to pay her for accrued but unused vacation time pursuant to its policy. Nieto sued for payment for accrued vacation time, alleging that the Market's policy violated CRS §§ 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) and -121 of the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA). The district court granted the Market's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Nieto argued that CRS § 8-4-121 voids the Market's policy because her accrued vacation pay was earned and determinable, so she has a right to payment for vacation time under the CWCA, and the Market's policy is an illegal waiver of her right to payment. CRS § 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) explicitly includes vacation pay in the definition of wages, but it also provides that no amount is to be considered wages until it is earned, vested, and determinable. Further, nothing in the CWCA creates a substantive right to payment for accrued but unused vacation time rather, an employee's right to such compensation is determined by the parties' employment agreement. Here, the agreement conditioned payment for accrued but unused vacation time, and Nieto did not meet those conditions. Therefore, she did not assert a plausible claim that she was entitled to accrued but unused vacation time. Further, the anti-waiver provision does not create any substantive entitlement to payment independent of the parties' agreement it only applies to rights conferred by the CWCA, which looks to the parties' agreement as the sole potential