No specific laws identified for this ruling.
The trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on claims against the psychiatrist and employer, finding them barred by res judicata, and granted motions to dismiss against other defendants. The plaintiff's constitutional challenge to Connecticut's medical malpractice certificate requirement and related claims were resolved against him.
The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the statute (§ 52-190a [a]) that requires a complaint sounding in medical malpractice to be accompanied by a good faith certificate and a letter authored by a similar health care provider opining that there appeared to be evidence of medical negligence. In 2006, following the suicide of his wife, the plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action against his wife's treating psychiatrist, A, and his employer, C Co., but failed to append to the complaint the good faith certificate and opinion letter required by § 52-190a (a). Although the plaintiff subsequently obtained an opinion letter and amended his complaint, the trial court dismissed the counts of the amended complaint sounding in medical negligence on the ground that the original complaint failed to comply with § 52- 190a (a). The trial court subsequently rendered judgment for A and C Co. on the remaining counts. Thereafter, in 2011, the plaintiff com- menced two additional actions against A and C Co., their telephone answering service, T Co., and its owners, and other governmental offi- cials, employees and entities, among others, in which he challenged the dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Those actions, both of which included the claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, ultimately were resolved against the plaintiff. In 2016, the plaintiff, representing himself, commenced the present action against A, C Co., T Co. and its owners, the state, the Appellate Court, and five Superior Court judges. Thereafter, the trial court granted A and C Co.'s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claims directed against them were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the plaintiff previously had or could have raised and litigated those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by T Co. and its owners, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the prior
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff, a director of member services at the defendant C Co., sought to recover damages from various defendants for alleged gender discrimi- nation and retaliation in violation of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Con- necticut Fair Employment Practices Act. A few years after the plaintiff was hired, several employees in her department resigned while she was the director, and a few of those employees expressed displeasure with working for her and voiced complaints about her during exit interviews. In response, the defendant D, the executive director of C Co., instructed B, the director of human resources of C Co., to conduct an investigation into the allegations, which resulted in the termination of the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff then commenced an action against C Co. and a related entity and a separate action against D, B and the defendant T, the deputy director of C Co., with whom the plaintiff did not get along. The two actions were consolidated for the purposes of discovery, pretrial pleadings and trial. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in each case, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact that would permit an inference of gender discrimi- nation or, in the alternative, that her termination was a pretext for gender discrimination. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in each case, as no reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff's termination was motivated in whole or in part by gender discrimination: the plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for her discharge, namely, repeated charges of mismanagement of employees and failure to respect authority as detailed in the report of the investigation, was a pretext for unlawful discriminatio
Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-293 (a)), an injured employee may assert a claim against and recover damages from a tortfeasor who is allegedly liable for the employee's work-related injury, even if the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for that injury, and an employer that has paid or has become obligated to pay those benefits to the employee "shall have a lien upon any judgment . . . or any settlement received by the employee from the [tortfeasor]." The plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate and as the decedent's surviving spouse, had filed for workers' compensation benefits after the decedent died of mesothelioma, which was caused in substantial part by his exposure to products containing asbestos during the course of his employ- ment with the defendants, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the town of Manchester. Prior to filing her claims for benefits, the plaintiff settled numerous product liability actions that she had brought against the manu- facturers and suppliers of the products containing asbestos to which the decedent had been exposed, with 70 percent of the net settlement proceeds awarded to the decedent's estate as damages for his personal injuries and death, and 30 percent of the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff for her loss of consortium. With respect to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, an administrative law judge of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, both at home and during the course of his employment with the defendants, was a significant factor in causing the decedent to develop mesothelioma. Because the decedent's meso- thelioma was caused in substantial part by this exposure to asbestos during his employment, total incapacity benefits were awarded to the decedent's estate and survivor's benefits were awarded to the plaintiff. The administra- tive law judge determined, however, that the defendants, as the decedent's e
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