Traylor v. State

The plaintiff, a director of member services at the defendant C Co., sought to recover damages from various defendants for alleged gender discrimi- nation and retaliation in violation of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Con- necticut Fair Employment Practices Act. A few years after the plaintiff was hired, several employees in her department resigned while she was the director, and a few of those employees expressed displeasure with working for her and voiced complaints about her during exit interviews. In response, the defendant D, the executive director of C Co., instructed B, the director of human resources of C Co., to conduct an investigation into the allegations, which resulted in the termination of the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff then commenced an action against C Co. and a related entity and a separate action against D, B and the defendant T, the deputy director of C Co., with whom the plaintiff did not get along. The two actions were consolidated for the purposes of discovery, pretrial pleadings and trial. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in each case, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact that would permit an inference of gender discrimi- nation or, in the alternative, that her termination was a pretext for gender discrimination. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in each case, as no reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff's termination was motivated in whole or in part by gender discrimination: the plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for her discharge, namely, repeated charges of mismanagement of employees and failure to respect authority as detailed in the report of the investigation, was a pretext for unlawful discriminatio

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had been dissolved, appealed from the trial court's postdissolution decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for modification of alimony and the defendant's motion for contempt, and to award the defendant past due alimony and attorney's fees. When the parties' marriage was dissolved in 2009, the plaintiff was employed as the chief executive officer of a major corporation and was paid a base annual salary and bonuses. The parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolu- tion, required the plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony in the amount of 30 percent of his ''gross annual base income from employment'' and 25 percent of his gross cash bonus. The plaintiff subsequently left that corporation and, in 2015, began working as a commercial real estate broker for C Co. Under C Co.'s compensation plan, the plaintiff received annual draws on future commissions, initially in the amount of $35,000 a year, and, if he did not earn commissions sufficient to cover the draws, he was obligated to pay the difference back to C Co. The plaintiff elected to have the draws deposited into a bank account in the name of a limited liability company, S Co., that he had created in 2014. The plaintiff also deposited into that account money he earned in connection with certain consulting work he performed on the side. The plaintiff notified the defendant when his employment at C Co. began, and she initially agreed to accept monthly alimony in the amount of $875, or 30 percent of the $35,000 annual draw. The plaintiff, however, continued to pay her only $875 per month, even though his annual draw rate increased significantly between 2015 and 2019. In response, the defendant filed her motion for contempt and sought payment of accrued, unpaid alimony that purport- edly was owed under the separation agreement. The plaintiff, on the other hand, sought to modify his alimony obligation due to a substantial change in

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for contempt as to a claimed arrearage for unallocated alimony and child support, claiming that the court incor- rectly determined that she was not entitled to receive a percentage of profit distributions received by the defendant from his purchased membership interest in a company, P Co. The trial court found that the defendant received income from two sources: commission income as an employee of C Co., and distributions as a member of P Co. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt, concluding that the distributions that the defendant received from P Co. were not included in the defendant's gross annual earned income from employment, as defined in the parties' separation agreement. Held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt because the distribu- tions received by the defendant as a member of P Co. were not included in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment as defined in the parties' separation agreement: the evidence supported the court's conclusion that the distributions were not derived from the defendant's employment with C Co., including expert testimony that the defendant had paid for an equity interest in P Co., and that the income he received derived from that interest; moreover, there was no provision in the members' agreement, which concerned distributions from P Co., that required members of P Co. to be employed by C Co., the defendant purchased his membership interest in P Co. postdissolu- tion, and he receives distributions on that investment, and the separation agreement provides that all income received by the defendant due to his investment of certain assets shall not be considered in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment. Argued January 19—officially released April 6, 2021

Workers' compensation-Appeals-R.C. 4123.512-Consent provision of R.C. 4123.512(D) does not violate Article IV, Section 5(B) of Ohio Constitution because workers' compensation appeals under R.C. 4123.512 are special statutory proceedings and consent provision renders Civ.R. 41(A) clearly inapplicable-Consent provision does not violate Equal Protection Clauses of Ohio and federal Constitutions because distinct classification of claimants in employer-initiated workers' compensation appeals is rationally related to legitimate purposes of limiting improper payments made during pendency of appeals and avoiding unnecessary delay in appeal process-Consent provision does not violate due-process guarantees of Ohio and federal Constitutions because provision is rationally related to legitimate purposes of avoiding needless extension of appeal process designed to run quickly, financial effects on system as whole, and waste of judicial resources-Court of appeals' judgment reversed.