No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Plaintiff recovered security deposit with double damages and prevailed on CUTPA claim; defendant's counterclaim partially denied. Trial court adopted trial referee's recommendation.
The plaintiff sought to recover the security deposit he paid to the defendant, his former landlord, in connection with the second of two residential leases that the parties had executed. The first lease was for approxi- mately twelve months and had an open-ended commencement date that began on the date the plaintiff commenced occupancy. The parties thereafter executed the second lease, which also ran for one year, and, under which, the plaintiff tendered the payment of the security deposit to the defendant pursuant to statute ([Rev. to 2013] § 47a-21 (d) (2)). On the day the plaintiff's tenancy concluded under the second lease, the defendant sent him an e-mail informing him of various items of damage to the property and inquiring whether he would repair the damage. When the plaintiff did not respond, the defendant sent him a second e-mail two weeks later, itemizing the damages and stating that he had incurred remediation costs, a loss of rent as a result of his inability to relet the property because of the damage, and that the plaintiff owed him unpaid rent for the final week of the first lease. The plaintiff then sent the defendant a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, seeking the return of the security deposit. The postal service returned the letter to the plaintiff with a notation that it was unclaimed and unable to be forwarded. In addition to the return of the security deposit, the plaintiff sought double damages pursuant to § 47a-21 (d) (2), and attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages as a result of the defendant's alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The defendant filed a counterclaim seeking damages for the remediation costs he incurred. The case was tried to an attorney trial referee, who recommended judgment for the plaintiff as to the security deposit, double damages and CUTPA claims, and for the defendant on his counterclaim in part. The trial court adopted the re
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025
The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's order remanding its administra- tive appeal from the decision of its human rights referee, which concluded that the defendant employer had discriminated against its former employee, M, on the basis of her disability but that M failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred by remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal. Held: The trial court erred in remanding the matter to the referee for an amended decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal because, pursuant to statute (§ 4-183), there was no legal basis for the remand, as there was no ambiguity in the referee's decision that required a clarification or an articulation. The trial court should have dismissed the appeal because there was substan- tial evidence in the record to support the referee's finding that M failed to prove that she was constructively discharged. Argued October 16, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025
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