No specific laws identified for this ruling.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's contempt motion, holding that profit distributions from the defendant's post-dissolution membership interest in P Co. were not included in 'gross annual earned income from employment' under the separation agreement and thus not subject to alimony/child support allocation.
The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the decision of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for contempt as to a claimed arrearage for unallocated alimony and child support, claiming that the court incor- rectly determined that she was not entitled to receive a percentage of profit distributions received by the defendant from his purchased membership interest in a company, P Co. The trial court found that the defendant received income from two sources: commission income as an employee of C Co., and distributions as a member of P Co. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt, concluding that the distributions that the defendant received from P Co. were not included in the defendant's gross annual earned income from employment, as defined in the parties' separation agreement. Held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt because the distribu- tions received by the defendant as a member of P Co. were not included in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment as defined in the parties' separation agreement: the evidence supported the court's conclusion that the distributions were not derived from the defendant's employment with C Co., including expert testimony that the defendant had paid for an equity interest in P Co., and that the income he received derived from that interest; moreover, there was no provision in the members' agreement, which concerned distributions from P Co., that required members of P Co. to be employed by C Co., the defendant purchased his membership interest in P Co. postdissolu- tion, and he receives distributions on that investment, and the separation agreement provides that all income received by the defendant due to his investment of certain assets shall not be considered in the definition of gross annual earned income from employment. Argued January 19—officially released April 6, 2021
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff, a director of member services at the defendant C Co., sought to recover damages from various defendants for alleged gender discrimi- nation and retaliation in violation of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Con- necticut Fair Employment Practices Act. A few years after the plaintiff was hired, several employees in her department resigned while she was the director, and a few of those employees expressed displeasure with working for her and voiced complaints about her during exit interviews. In response, the defendant D, the executive director of C Co., instructed B, the director of human resources of C Co., to conduct an investigation into the allegations, which resulted in the termination of the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff then commenced an action against C Co. and a related entity and a separate action against D, B and the defendant T, the deputy director of C Co., with whom the plaintiff did not get along. The two actions were consolidated for the purposes of discovery, pretrial pleadings and trial. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in each case, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact that would permit an inference of gender discrimi- nation or, in the alternative, that her termination was a pretext for gender discrimination. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in each case, as no reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff's termination was motivated in whole or in part by gender discrimination: the plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for her discharge, namely, repeated charges of mismanagement of employees and failure to respect authority as detailed in the report of the investigation, was a pretext for unlawful discriminatio
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025
The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's order remanding its administra- tive appeal from the decision of its human rights referee, which concluded that the defendant employer had discriminated against its former employee, M, on the basis of her disability but that M failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred by remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal. Held: The trial court erred in remanding the matter to the referee for an amended decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal because, pursuant to statute (§ 4-183), there was no legal basis for the remand, as there was no ambiguity in the referee's decision that required a clarification or an articulation. The trial court should have dismissed the appeal because there was substan- tial evidence in the record to support the referee's finding that M failed to prove that she was constructively discharged. Argued October 16, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025
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