Appellate court reversed summary judgment granted to state marshal defendant, holding that state marshals are not entitled to sovereign immunity and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding statutory immunity under § 6-38a(b).
The plaintiff, whose real property had been foreclosed on, brought an action against the defendant, a state marshal, alleging that the defendant stole, or allowed to be stolen, numerous items of the plaintiff's personal prop- erty when the defendant executed an order of ejectment at the property subsequent to the foreclosure. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant deprived him of certain of his constitutional rights and committed numer- ous violations of state law, including civil conspiracy and larceny. The defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no genuine issue of material fact existed. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immu- nity, which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity (§ 6-38a (b)) because there was no evidence of wanton, reckless or malicious conduct on his part. The court thereafter rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly concluded that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, as state marshals are not state officials or public officials, and, thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to an action against them for tortious conduct: the defendant's status as a state marshal is circumscribed by statute, as the legislature, following the abolition of the system of sheriffs by constitutional amend- ment and the passage of No. 99 of the 2000 Public Acts (P.A. 00-99), specifically designated state marshals as independent contractors who are compensated on a fee for service basis by agreement with an attor- ney, court or public agency, and who may not be a state marshal and a state employee at the same time, irrespective of the nature of the party that
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1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Fraser's wrongful termination and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on the grounds that he did not seek judicial review of the administrative order affirming his termination? 2. Did the trial court err in dismissing Fraser's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for failure to state a claim?
Negligence duty of care sexual assault Title IX Section 1983 substantive due process equal protection independent contractor tort law failure to train and supervise precedent education special-needs exceptional children summary judgment and motion to dismiss
Negligence duty of care sexual assault Title IX Section 1983 substantive due process equal protection independent contractor tort law failure to train and supervise precedent education special-needs exceptional children summary judgment and motion to dismiss
The plaintiff, Michael Crenshaw, appealed from a January 7, 2019 judgment entered in the Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, the State of Rhode Island and Lieutenant Scott Raynes (State Defendants) and the Community College of Rhode Island, the Council on Postsecondary Education, and Captain Timothy Poulin (CCRI Defendants), pursuant to a grant of both the State Defendants' motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the CCRI Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on Rule 12(c). The plaintiff also appealed from a December 21, 2018 order denying his motion to amend his complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in dismissing his claim under G.L. 1956 § 28-50-3 of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (the Act) because, in the plaintiff's view, the statute does not limit protection to reports of the particular employer relative to which the Act's protection is sought. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint as to the allegations supporting his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations and, therefore, futile. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim under the Act because the activity occurred while Mr. Crenshaw was not employed by the defendants and involved violations of law allegedly committed by a previous employer—an entity that had no nexus with CCRI. The Court also held that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint as futile because his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and the order of the Superior Court.
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025
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