No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal, holding that § 8-2 zoning authority permits creation of planned development districts and that the Planning & Zoning Commission's approval of the planned development district was authorized by state law.
The plaintiffs, who own real property in the city of Shelton, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission approving an application for a planned development district submitted by the defendant S Co. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal from the commission's decision, and the plaintiffs appealed, claiming, inter alia, that this court's decision in Campion v. Board of Alderman (278 Conn. 500), in which the court concluded that a special act of the legislature authorizing zoning in the city of New Haven allowed for the creation of a planned development district, did not authorize municipalities, such as Shelton, that derive their authority to zone by statute (§ 8-2), rather than by a special act, to establish such districts. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the zoning authority conferred by § 8-2 did not support the creation of planned development districts: a comparison of the language in the special act at issue in Campion, the language of the enabling act at issue in Sheridan v. Planning Board (159 Conn. 1), and the language of § 8-2, which allowed the defendant commission to create and alter zones, led this court to conclude that § 8-2 permits the creation of planned development districts like the one at issue in the present case; moreover, the legislature's prior repeal of legislation that provided for a detailed procedure for the approval of planned developments did not evince a legislative intent to eliminate or severely limit the use of planned developments, as that legislation was repealed because its provisions were largely viewed as unnecessary and unduly burdensome, and the legislature's enactment of a statute (§ 8-2m) expressly allowing for the use of flexible zoning techniques was not intended to preclude the generalized application of § 8-2 or to restrict the zoning devices that it allows; furthermore, there was no indication that the development in the present cas
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-293 (a)), an injured employee may assert a claim against and recover damages from a tortfeasor who is allegedly liable for the employee's work-related injury, even if the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for that injury, and an employer that has paid or has become obligated to pay those benefits to the employee "shall have a lien upon any judgment . . . or any settlement received by the employee from the [tortfeasor]." The plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate and as the decedent's surviving spouse, had filed for workers' compensation benefits after the decedent died of mesothelioma, which was caused in substantial part by his exposure to products containing asbestos during the course of his employ- ment with the defendants, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the town of Manchester. Prior to filing her claims for benefits, the plaintiff settled numerous product liability actions that she had brought against the manu- facturers and suppliers of the products containing asbestos to which the decedent had been exposed, with 70 percent of the net settlement proceeds awarded to the decedent's estate as damages for his personal injuries and death, and 30 percent of the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff for her loss of consortium. With respect to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, an administrative law judge of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, both at home and during the course of his employment with the defendants, was a significant factor in causing the decedent to develop mesothelioma. Because the decedent's meso- thelioma was caused in substantial part by this exposure to asbestos during his employment, total incapacity benefits were awarded to the decedent's estate and survivor's benefits were awarded to the plaintiff. The administra- tive law judge determined, however, that the defendants, as the decedent's e
Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no
Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no
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