The court affirmed the lower court's decision setting aside the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board's order for a second election, holding that the Hospital was under no legal compulsion to furnish employee addresses to the Union absent a Board rule or direct order requiring disclosure.
Error, to the Common Pleas of Chester county. This was an action of replevin, in which William Dripps was plaintiff, and Joseph M. Christian defendant. William Dripps, the plaintiff, was the owner of a foundry and machine shop in the village of Midway, which, on the 1st December, 1851, he sold by articles of agreement to Henry Bisbing and John P. Burn, to deliver them possession on the 1st of April, 1852, for the sum of $13,000; $1000 thereof, and for which they gave their promissory note, payable on the 1st April, 1852, and the balance in annual payments of $2000, Dripps to make them a deed when the amount of $4000 should have been paid; and the balance of $9000 to be secured by a mortgage on the premises. Bisbing & Burn made the payment, of $1000 due on the 1st April, 1852, and the payment of $2000 on the 1st April, 1853, together with $720, the interest due at that time. On the 20th June, 1853, the defendant, Joseph M. Christian, joined them as a partner in the establishment, and the following entry was made in their day-book:— “Midway, June 20, 1853. “Henry Bisbing, John P. Burn, and Joseph M. Christian, associate themselves together mutually for the purpose of carrying on the foundry, car building, and general machine business, in the village of Midway, Chester county, Pennsylvania, Bisbing & Burn transferring to said firm such of their liabilities and resources as may be mutually agreed upon, and Joseph M. Christian investing tools, stock, and cash to the amount of $2800, profits and losses to be equally shared, after paying each party interest on his investment.” The defendant objected to the admission of the books in evidence, but the court overruled the objection and admitted them, and sealed a bill of exceptions thereto at the instance of defendant’s counsel. There are no signatures to this statement. Immediately after it follows first a statement of the assets of the firm of Bisbing $• Burn, consisting o
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
constructive discharge, hostile work environment, reverse racial discrimination, negligent hiring/retention/supervision
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant school district for her alleged constructive discharge from employment as a teacher. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately twenty-four years when she resigned from her position in August, 2019. On December 19, 2019, she filed an age discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). There- after, the CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), constructive discharge, and breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was seventy years old, claimed that she was forced to resign after the defendant created an intolerable work environment by marginalizing and unfairly criticizing her because it wanted to replace her with a younger teacher. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and, thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging only constructive discharge. In that complaint, the plaintiff added allegations related to a report issued by the defendant on June 10, 2019, in which it acknowledged that an assistant principal had copied certain portions of the plaintiff's prior evaluations into her 2016–2017 school year evaluation and recommended a review of adminis- trators' practices of referencing evaluations from prior years. The defen- dant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's complaint to the CHRO was untimely pursuant to the 180 day limitation period set forth in the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)), because the plaintiff had failed to identify conduct relating to an intolerable working environment that had persisted to June 22, 2019, o
Summary Judgment, Qualified Immunity, Civ.R. 56(C), 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), Civil Conspiracy, Wrongful Termination. Defendant established that tolling statues did not apply to Plaintiff's claims for civil conspiracy and wrongful termination in violation of public policy as the state of Ohio has consented to be sued in only one forum – the Court of Claims. Additionally, the Court held that the savings statute did not apply to Plaintiff's third attempt at filing the same claims. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims for conversion, intellectual theft, unjust enrichment, and lost opportunities were held to be untimely filed. Plaintiff's initial cause of action originated more than four years prior to the filing of this case. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
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