The court reversed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's award against Daily Express, finding the decedent driver was the employee of Noltee (the truck owner), not Daily. Benefits were awarded to the widow against Noltee instead.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of JElh county: Of January Term 1873, No. 22. This was an action of ejectment, brought December 17th 1870, by John G. Reading and Charles Bartles against A. C. Einney and others, for a tract of land in Jay township, containing 154 acres more or less. The tract is part of warrant No. 4896 to Wilhelm Willink, surveyed July 18th 1794, as 990 acres, in Clearfield county. The survey was interfered with by other warrants surveyed in 1785, known as the “ Creek Surveys,” so that warrant and survey No. 4896 could hold but 790 acres. The plaintiffs claimed the 154 acres under one Joel Woodworth, who they alleged had marked off from the east side of the 790 acres and occupied this tract which he estimated to contain 150 acres; it was sold for taxes in 1852, in Elk county, in which it then was; Elk county having been erected in 1844 and this part of Clearfield county included in it, the plaintiffs claimed under that sale. Warrant No. 4896 had been assessed as 559 acres in Clearfield county, sold for taxes in 1832, bought by the commissioners of that county; in 1838 the commissioners sold it to Josiah W. Smith, by metes and bounds, describing the whole of warrant No. 4896, except that part covered by the “ Creek Surveys.” The defendants claimed the 150 acres as part of warrant No. 4896, and as included in the tax sale to the commissioners, and the sale of the commissioners to Mr. Smith. The question was whether the 150 acres were so separated from the rest of the survey, as to exclude them from the operation of the tax sale of the warrant as 559 acres in 1832. The case was tried August 6th 1872, before Vincent, J. The plaintiffs gave in evidence the warrant and survey to Willink, of No. 4896; assessment in Clearfield county for 1826, No. 4896; 150 acres to Joel Woodworth and for 1829, same. They gave evidence that this 150 acre tract was sold for taxes for the years 1845 and 1846 in the name of Peter
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constructive discharge, hostile work environment, reverse racial discrimination, negligent hiring/retention/supervision
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant school district for her alleged constructive discharge from employment as a teacher. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately twenty-four years when she resigned from her position in August, 2019. On December 19, 2019, she filed an age discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). There- after, the CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), constructive discharge, and breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was seventy years old, claimed that she was forced to resign after the defendant created an intolerable work environment by marginalizing and unfairly criticizing her because it wanted to replace her with a younger teacher. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and, thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging only constructive discharge. In that complaint, the plaintiff added allegations related to a report issued by the defendant on June 10, 2019, in which it acknowledged that an assistant principal had copied certain portions of the plaintiff's prior evaluations into her 2016–2017 school year evaluation and recommended a review of adminis- trators' practices of referencing evaluations from prior years. The defen- dant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's complaint to the CHRO was untimely pursuant to the 180 day limitation period set forth in the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)), because the plaintiff had failed to identify conduct relating to an intolerable working environment that had persisted to June 22, 2019, o
Summary Judgment, Qualified Immunity, Civ.R. 56(C), 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), Civil Conspiracy, Wrongful Termination. Defendant established that tolling statues did not apply to Plaintiff's claims for civil conspiracy and wrongful termination in violation of public policy as the state of Ohio has consented to be sued in only one forum – the Court of Claims. Additionally, the Court held that the savings statute did not apply to Plaintiff's third attempt at filing the same claims. The remainder of Plaintiff's claims for conversion, intellectual theft, unjust enrichment, and lost opportunities were held to be untimely filed. Plaintiff's initial cause of action originated more than four years prior to the filing of this case. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
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