The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's award of total disability benefits to claimant for bronchiectasis contracted from coal dust exposure during his employment.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County : Of January Term 1882, No. 227. Assumpsit, by Jacob Houck and Anne Houck, his wife, against Hiram Houck and Jacob Houck, executors of the will of Jacob Houck, deceased, “ for work, labor and services performed by the plaintiff at the special instance and request of the said Jacob Houck, deceased.” The narr. also contained a count for “ wages or salary of the said Anne Houck .... as the hired servant of the said Jacob Houck, deceased.” Pleas, non assumpsit; non assumpsit infra sex annos; payment; payment with leave, &c., and set-off. On the trial, before Futhey, P. J., the facts appeared be as follows : — The plaintiff, Anne Houck, lived with her parents Jacob Houck, Sr., and Mary Houck, on their farm, performing household work, and taking care of her parents, both of whom were old and diseased. In 1878, she married Jacob Houck (her cousin) who lived on the farm as a hired hand. She and her husband continued to live on the farm after their marriage in the same manner as before, for about two years, until her mother’s death, when they moved away. Her father died about a year and a half later. By his will Anne was left an equal share with his other children. About two months after his death Anne made a demand on his executors for the payment of wages as a domestic servant, and for nursing her mother, for a year and three months prior to her mother’s death. This demand being refused, this suit was brought. No express promise of payment for services was shown. The defendant presented the following points : 1. The relationship of the parties is such that under the evidence the jury must find for the defendants. Eefused. 2. The time which elapsed after the ' alleged claim accrued, and before any demand was made, such that the presumption of law, under the facts in this case, is ‘ either that the wages have been paid, or that the services were performed on the footing that no payment
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
constructive discharge, hostile work environment, reverse racial discrimination, negligent hiring/retention/supervision
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant school district for her alleged constructive discharge from employment as a teacher. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately twenty-four years when she resigned from her position in August, 2019. On December 19, 2019, she filed an age discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). There- after, the CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), constructive discharge, and breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was seventy years old, claimed that she was forced to resign after the defendant created an intolerable work environment by marginalizing and unfairly criticizing her because it wanted to replace her with a younger teacher. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and, thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging only constructive discharge. In that complaint, the plaintiff added allegations related to a report issued by the defendant on June 10, 2019, in which it acknowledged that an assistant principal had copied certain portions of the plaintiff's prior evaluations into her 2016–2017 school year evaluation and recommended a review of adminis- trators' practices of referencing evaluations from prior years. The defen- dant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's complaint to the CHRO was untimely pursuant to the 180 day limitation period set forth in the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)), because the plaintiff had failed to identify conduct relating to an intolerable working environment that had persisted to June 22, 2019, o
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