Fiorillo v. Hartford

The plaintiff, whose prior employment as a police officer with the defendant city of Hartford had been terminated, sought to recover damages from the city for, inter alia, its failure to rehire him as a police officer because of his disability, narcolepsy. The city had posted a job listing seeking applications from nonresidents of Hartford for a police officer position. Applicants were required to apply online and to include with their appli- cations a ''CHIP'' card signifying that they had successfully completed certain physical ability tests required of police officer candidates. The plaintiff, who was not a resident of Hartford, was among fifty-two appli- cants who did not submit a CHIP card with their applications and, thus, was determined by the city to be unqualified for the police officer position. In a two count complaint alleging violations of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), the plaintiff claimed that the city had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and retaliated against him for having previously brought a lawsuit against the city in connection with the termination of his prior employment as a police officer. The city, which was aware at the time the plaintiff applied for the police officer position that he had been diagnosed with narcolepsy, moved for summary judg- ment, asserting that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to both counts of the plaintiff's complaint and that it was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the city's motion, conclud- ing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of either disability discrimination or retaliation and that, even if he had established a prima facie case as to those claims, summary judgment was warranted on both counts because the city had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for its decision not

Estate—Jurisdiction—Constructive Trust—Testamentary Capacity—Undue Influence—Jury Trial—Contempt. Dr. Arlen E. Owens (the decedent) hired Dominguez as his private caregiver in 2010. The decedent died in July 2013. After the decedent's death, his brother and only living heir, Owens, filed a petition for informal probate of the decedent's will, and later a petition for determination of testacy and for determination of heirs, alleging that the will that the decedent had signed in 2012 was the product of undue influence by Dominguez and that the decedent had lacked the capacity to execute the will. He also filed a complaint for recovery of estate assets and asked the court to invalidate the will and order the decedent's estate to be administered under intestate distribution statutes. In 2015, Owens also filed a petition to set aside non-probate transfers for three bank accounts for which Dominguez was payable-on-death (POD) beneficiary. The court imposed a constructive trust over the POD accounts. The court later upheld the will but found that the decedent had not had the capacity to execute the POD designations and had been unduly influenced by Dominguez. After issuance of the final judgment, the court issued a contempt order against Dominguez for violating the constructive trust that included the condition that she could purge the contempt by paying back the money from the bank accounts. On appeal, Dominguez contended that the district court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the POD designations and impose a constructive trust on the POD accounts because Owens and the estate did not have standing to make such requests. A district court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with estates. The claims regarding the POD designations arose in connection with and were essential to the estate administration. Thus, the court had jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust, Owens had standing, and the court had jurisdiction

This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court ("divorce court") in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 ("2009 PPP") upon the parties' stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother's 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother's request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court ("trial court") in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in "technical contempt" and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 ("2015 PPP"). The 2015 PPP maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an "e