No specific laws identified for this ruling.
The plaintiff prevailed on three counts of fraudulent transfer against the defendants under Connecticut's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA) and common law. The trial court found that the defendant W fraudulently transferred funds to defendant J (his spouse) to shield assets from creditors, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment.
Pursuant to statute (§ 52-552e (a)), ''[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor's claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.'' The defendant J appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered for the plaintiff on three counts of his complaint that asserted claims of fraudulent transfer against J and her husband, the defendant W, pursuant to the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA) (§ 52- 552a et seq.). In September, 2004, on the advice of W, the plaintiff transferred funds from his 401 (k) account into an individual retirement account (IRA) comanaged by A Co., W's employer. W subsequently formed T Co., and he left his employment with A Co. in 2007. In 2008, on the advice of W, the plaintiff transferred the balance of his IRA into another entity, and the funds were subsequently transferred to a bank account owned by T Co. so that W, as the sole member of T Co., could fully manage and invest the funds for the plaintiff. As part of this transaction, T Co. issued an unsecured promissory note to the plaintiff in the amount of $185,000. The plaintiff invested additional funds into accounts held and managed by T Co. in 2009 and 2011, bringing the plaintiff's total principal investment to more than $227,000. Thereafter, W mismanaged the plaintiff's investments and was negligent in the han- d
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff filed an affidavit of illegal discriminatory practice with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the defendant A Co. wrongfully terminated her employment. Follow- ing an assignment of the matter to the commission's Office of Public Hearings, a human rights referee granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff and the commission separately appealed the referee's decision granting the motion for summary judgment to the Superior Court. The plaintiff claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court consolidated the appeals, sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a trial before the Office of Public Hearings, concluding that the referee improperly rendered summary judgment because A Co. did not meet its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. On A Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a hearing: the court properly considered the plaintiff's affidavit as competent evidence in opposition to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiff's affidavit of discriminatory prac- tice was sworn and was properly considered pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-49); moreover, the court properly conducted a plenary review of the record in considering whether genuine issues of material fact existed, as the deferential standard used to review administrative fact-finding did not extend to the determination of whether genuine issues of material fact existed in the summary judgment context; furthermore, the court did not err in considering whether genu- ine issues of material fact existed, as the record contained contradictory information, including a sworn statement by an employee of A Co. that the plaintiff's job duties required her to be physically present at the workplace and the plaint
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025
The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's order remanding its administra- tive appeal from the decision of its human rights referee, which concluded that the defendant employer had discriminated against its former employee, M, on the basis of her disability but that M failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred by remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal. Held: The trial court erred in remanding the matter to the referee for an amended decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal because, pursuant to statute (§ 4-183), there was no legal basis for the remand, as there was no ambiguity in the referee's decision that required a clarification or an articulation. The trial court should have dismissed the appeal because there was substan- tial evidence in the record to support the referee's finding that M failed to prove that she was constructively discharged. Argued October 16, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025
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