City of Cleveland

State Employment Relations Board; SERB; abuse of discretion; collective bargaining; R.C. 4117.11(A)(5); R.C. 4117.08; effects; policy change; collective-bargaining agreement; CBA. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the State Employment Relations Board's ("SERB") order and opinion finding that the City of Cleveland committed an unfair labor practice in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(5) when it refused to bargain with the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association regarding the effects of a wearable-camera system, because the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties did not expressly and specifically state that the association was giving up the right to bargain the effects of the policy change.

R.C. Chapter 4117 collective bargaining agreement State Employee Relations Board union grievance arbitration fact-finder unfair labor practice R.C. 2711.10 arbitration award rational nexus. The trial court did not err when it found that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the city and the union. SERB had already dismissed the union and the city's unfair labor practice charges and the arbitrator's decision that he had jurisdiction over the collective bargaining agreement issues was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. The trial court did not err when it found that the arbitrator was within his authority to interpret missing essential terms in the collective bargaining agreement the arbitrator's interpretation was based on contract law and arbitral labor law and did not create an agreement where one did not previously exist. The arbitrator's decision was rationally based upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement therefore, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers and the award is not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

Arbitration arbitration award arbitrator R.C. 2711.10 vacate award exceed authority essence of the agreement de novo review. The common pleas court erred in granting the appellee's motion to vacate the arbitration award. An arbitration award must be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds his authority or the award does not draw its essence from the parties' agreement. An award draws its essence from the agreement when it is rationally derived from the terms of the agreement. The appellant charged a member of the appellee union with gross insubordination and conduct unbecoming. Under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, gross insubordination is punishable by termination, demotion, or suspension exceeding 72 hours without pay insubordination is punishable by official reprimand and suspension of up to 72 hours without pay and conduct unbecoming is punishable by official reprimand and suspension of up to 24 hours without pay. The questions submitted to the arbitrator were whether the appellant had just cause to suspend the union member for 24 hours and issue him a written reprimand, and if not, to determine the appropriate remedy. The arbitrator found that the union member's conduct was not insubordinate but was unbecoming. The arbitrator awarded compensation for any lost wages and benefits resulting from the union member's 24-hour suspension but retained the written reprimand in his personnel file. The award resolved the questions submitted to arbitration and was rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority in issuing the award, and the award drew its essence from the agreement. Therefore, the common pleas court erred in vacating the award.

Civ.R. 56/summary judgment civil service examinations eligibility back pay, seniority attorney fees use of competitive exam writ of mandamus. The trial court's writ order requiring the city to administer competitive examinations was clear and unambiguous and not in need of clarification. The trial court did not err in denying the relator-appellant's request for back pay and other benefits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's request for attorney fees because there was no bad faith on the part of the appellee.

Administrative appeal R.C. 2506.04 due process preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's judgment affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission is supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence in the record. Appellee did not violate appellant's due process rights in terminating appellant's employment.

Prohibition—Trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over claims falling within the State Employment Relations Board's exclusive jurisdiction—Writ granted.

Writ of mandamus R.C. 149.43 mootness attorney fees failure to respond reasonable time costs. Relator was entitled to attorney fees incurred in the bringing of a mandamus action to require respondent city to produce public records, where the records were released after the filing of the mandamus action but prior to its conclusion, rendering that portion of the action moot.

Arbitration R.C. Chapter 2711 modification jurisdiction trial court's authority execution of judgment Civ.R. 52 findings of fact some evidence. Where the arbitrator's award of "reasonable and demonstrable lost back pay" was confirmed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal, the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to revisit the award. The trial court's award thereafter of a sum certain was not a modification of the arbitrator's award but rather a proper exercise of the court's inherent authority to interpret and enforce judgments. The trial court's damage award was supported by some evidence. We therefore must presume regularity and affirm the trial court's award.

Trial court did not err by affirming SERB order dismissing union's request for recognition. Affording appropriate deference to SERB in the interpretation of Chapter 4117, the trial court did not err in concluding that SERB properly concluded that assistant directors of law in the Civil Division of the City of Cleveland Department of Law met the three elements of the exclusion contained in R.C. 4117.01(C)(9) and, therefore, were not within the definition of public employee for purposes of the public employee collective bargaining law.