Shelby County Board of Education

Appellee was injured in an automobile accident where Appellant's, a governmental entity, employee was 100% at-fault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Appellant's governmental immunity had been removed; (2) admitting testimony from two of Appellee's treating physicians; and (3) admitting certain medical billing records. Appellees ask this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court order and deny Appellees' request for appellate attorney's fees.

This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured schoolteacher. The trial court determined that the termination constituted an impermissible second punishment for conduct for which the schoolteacher had previously been suspended and ordered his reinstatement. Finding that the termination letter charged the schoolteacher with conduct which was not contemplated in the suspension letter, and with conduct which had not occurred at the time of the suspension, we reverse.

Appellee, a tenured high school teacher, petitioned for judicial review of Appellant Shelby County Board of Education's decision to terminate his employment. Without making findings to explain its reasoning, the trial court remanded the case to the school board for a second hearing. From our review, neither party argued that the school board's initial hearing was procedurally deficient. As such, the trial court's decision to remand the case to the school board, without findings to support such decision, was error. Vacated and Remanded

This is a teacher tenure case. Appellant, a tenured teacher employed by Appellee Shelby County Board of Education, was fired for insubordination and conduct unbecoming. Appellant appealed the Shelby County School Board's decision to the Chancery Court for Shelby County. In a post-trial motion, Appellee petitioned the court to consider an email notification of the board's decision that was sent to Appellant's attorney. Specifically, Appellee argued that the email constituted statutory notice to the Appellant so as to start the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal of the board's decision in the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. 49-5-513(b). The trial court denied the motion as newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the email goes directly to the question of whether the Appellant's petition was timely so as to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating the motion as one for permission to file "newly discovered evidence." Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on the admissibility of the email evidence and did not address the question of its subject-matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.