State ex rel. Stoicoiu v. Stow-Munroe Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

<bold>1. Pleadings — 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss — consideration of documents</bold> <bold>not attached to complaint — motion not converted to summary judgment</bold> <block_quote> A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was not converted into a motion for summary judgment where the court considered documents not attached to the complaint. Those documents were referred to in the complaint and formed the procedural basis for the complaint.</block_quote><page_number>Page 253</page_number> <bold>2. Employer and Employee — retaliatory discharge — time limit for claim</bold> <block_quote> The 180-day time limit for filing a Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act claim with the North Carolina Department of Labor is mandatory even though there is no express statutory consequence for failing to file within the time limit.</block_quote> <bold>3. Statutes of Limitations and Repose — retaliatory discharge —</bold> <bold>time limits for filing</bold> <block_quote> There is no merit in the argument that the 3-year limitations period of N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>1-52</cross_reference> should control the 180-day filing limit of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act.</block_quote> <bold>4. Employer and Employee — retaliatory discharge — motion to amend —</bold> <bold>additional claim — responsive pleading not filed — futile motion</bold> <block_quote> The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to assert an additional claim under the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act based on an alleged post-complaint incident of discrimination where the original claim was time-barred and plaintiff failed to file his additional claim with the N.C. Department of Labor before seeking to add it to his complaint so that allowance of the amendment would have been futile.</block_quote> <bold>5. Employer and Employee; Workers' Compensation — wrongful discharge —</bold> <bold>assertion of workers' compensation rights — amen

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025

Former CEO brought an action for libel, false light invasion of privacy, and retaliatory discharge pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act. In this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), we affirm the trial court.

This case stems from a retaliatory discharge claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded her $3,000.00 in compensatory damages and $12,500.00 in punitive damages. The trial court then awarded the plaintiff $12,500.00 of the over $100,000.00 in attorney's fees she requested. Following a remand from this Court, the trial court increased the attorney's fees award to $32,000.00. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court's second attorney's fees award, we affirm. We also award the plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the first appeal.