IN RE NATHANIEL D.

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BECKHAM COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE DOUG HAUGHT, TRIAL JUDGE ¶ 0 The trial court judgment (1) ordered father — a prison inmate — to reimburse the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for monies allegedly paid to mother for the support of child under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and (2) set his continuing/future child support obligation at $109 per month. Father appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Held: The trial court erred in entering a judgment for AFDC reimbursement without being presented evidence to show the amount of AFDC payments to mother. Further, although under Oklahoma's child support statutes (a) appellant's present lack of income and earning capacity due to his incarceration, coupled with his lack of assets, did not mandate that the trial court use zero for his gross monthly income in figuring his child support obligation and (b) it was proper for the trial court to attribute a gross monthly income to him based on the minimum wage for a 40 hour work-week, error occurred in setting the child support obligation at $109 per month because there was no evidence concerning mother's gross monthly income. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED IN PART; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother's and Father's rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child's best interest to terminate Father's rights. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

<bold>1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction — home state</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by declining jurisdiction over this child custody matter and by concluding that Vermont was the home state of the children, because: (1) the minor children were not living in North Carolina for the required six months prior to the commencement of plaintiff mother's custody proceedings, and except for a six-week period in January and February 2002, the minor children lived continuously in Vermont from August 2001 to July 2002; (2) the totality of circumstances shows the six-week absence was merely a temporary absence, and in light of the numerous relocations and decisions, the parties' intent at the specific time they retrieved the minor children standing alone should not control the determination of whether the absence was temporary; (3) the length of absence from Vermont was a relatively short period of time, especially when compared to the fact that the minor children had spent almost the entire previous year in Vermont; and (4) Vermont's exercise of jurisdiction is proper under both North Carolina's UCCJEA provisions and Vermont's UCCJA provisions.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody — notice —</bold> <bold>substantial conformity</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a child custody case when it found that Vermont had issued its order in substantial conformity with the UCCJA and that plaintiff mother had notice and was aware of the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction before the Vermont court on 18 September 2002, because: (1) plaintiff conceded that the notice of hearing stated in all capital letters that both parties must appear and failure to appear meant it was possible for the court to issue parental rights and responsibilities based on the evidence presented by the other party; and (2) plaintiff responded to defendant's motion and specifically raised