Matyas v. Matyas

<p>This case was decided by the court En Banc.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.</p> <p>Statement.</p> <p>On December 21st, 1908, John M. Prall brought in the circuit court for Hillsborough county, Florida, a suit in equity for a divorce from his wife Emma L. Prall. In the amended bill of complaint it is alleged that the couple were married April 3, 1895, at Fort Dodge, Iowa; that they lived together in Iowa and two children were born to them; that during their married life till he finally separated from her, the complainant was a faithful and devoted husband; that during their residence in Iowa the wife became enamored with a strange religious sect and a devotee at its altar; * * * that from the time of her conversion to the belief of this sect the defendant began to be estranged from the complainant because of his inability to join her in the adoption of the tenets of this religion;” that to please her he moved to Estero in Lee county, Florida, where the sect was established; that the wife “further yielding to the doctrine of this sect, which holds as one of its beliefs that the members of the sect or union are married in Christ and are not properly married to any one, withdrew herself from all marital relations with complainant, abjuring him in every way and telling him that his approaches were obnoxious to her; that she refused to * * * allow complainant the privileges of a husband; that during this time the respondent became more and more undutiful in her relations towards complainant, being enraged with complainant on account of his refusal to submit all of their property to be community property with the said religious society as aforesaid; thaf^lie constantly chided him upon his sinfulness and sought to estrange his children from him. Moreover complainant says that respondent ceased in every way to render services to him as a wife, and instead of extending to him courtesy and respect due a husband, maligned him and abused him in t

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BECKHAM COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE DOUG HAUGHT, TRIAL JUDGE ¶ 0 The trial court judgment (1) ordered father — a prison inmate — to reimburse the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for monies allegedly paid to mother for the support of child under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and (2) set his continuing/future child support obligation at $109 per month. Father appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Held: The trial court erred in entering a judgment for AFDC reimbursement without being presented evidence to show the amount of AFDC payments to mother. Further, although under Oklahoma's child support statutes (a) appellant's present lack of income and earning capacity due to his incarceration, coupled with his lack of assets, did not mandate that the trial court use zero for his gross monthly income in figuring his child support obligation and (b) it was proper for the trial court to attribute a gross monthly income to him based on the minimum wage for a 40 hour work-week, error occurred in setting the child support obligation at $109 per month because there was no evidence concerning mother's gross monthly income. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED IN PART; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

<bold>1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction — home state</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by declining jurisdiction over this child custody matter and by concluding that Vermont was the home state of the children, because: (1) the minor children were not living in North Carolina for the required six months prior to the commencement of plaintiff mother's custody proceedings, and except for a six-week period in January and February 2002, the minor children lived continuously in Vermont from August 2001 to July 2002; (2) the totality of circumstances shows the six-week absence was merely a temporary absence, and in light of the numerous relocations and decisions, the parties' intent at the specific time they retrieved the minor children standing alone should not control the determination of whether the absence was temporary; (3) the length of absence from Vermont was a relatively short period of time, especially when compared to the fact that the minor children had spent almost the entire previous year in Vermont; and (4) Vermont's exercise of jurisdiction is proper under both North Carolina's UCCJEA provisions and Vermont's UCCJA provisions.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody — notice —</bold> <bold>substantial conformity</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a child custody case when it found that Vermont had issued its order in substantial conformity with the UCCJA and that plaintiff mother had notice and was aware of the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction before the Vermont court on 18 September 2002, because: (1) plaintiff conceded that the notice of hearing stated in all capital letters that both parties must appear and failure to appear meant it was possible for the court to issue parental rights and responsibilities based on the evidence presented by the other party; and (2) plaintiff responded to defendant's motion and specifically raised

<p>APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Ada County. Hon. Charles P. McCarthy, Judge.</p> <p>Action for divorce. Judgment for defendant.</p> <p>■ “The findings of fact must support the judgment, and if not, the judgment must be reversed.” (Ponting v. Isaman, 7 Ida. 581, 65 Pac. 434.) .</p> <p>“There is not a substantial conflict in the evidence such as to bring it within the rule that where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, the finding of the court will not be disturbed.” (Wood v. Broderson, 12 Ida. 190, 85 Pac. 490.)</p> <p>“In equity cases the appellate court will examine the evidence with a view to sustain the trial court in its findings and judgment, but will reverse the judgment if the evidence, is insufficient to sustain it.” {Small v. Harrington, 10 Ida. 499, 79 Pac. 461.1</p> <p>\Where there is substantial conflict in the evidence on which any finding of fact is based

<p>Appeal from Pike Circuit Court. — Hon. Dwvid H. Eby, J udge.</p> <p>(1) All of the indignities alleged in plaintiff’s petition, in the ease at bar, except the charge of poisoning, were trivial, ancient, and had been condoned, if indeed they ever constituted offenses which would justify a severance of the marital ties. As to the charge that defendant attempted to take plaintiff’s life by administering strychnine poison, she certainly is entitled to the same presumption of innocence which would prevail in the event she were arrested and required to be defendant against such a charge in the criminal courts, and it certainly follows that the same quantum, of proof would be required to establish her guilt in the case at bar, as it would in a criminal case. Before a court could properly find against her in this case on that issue she should be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 Rice on Evidence, see. 85, p. 125. (2) The court erred in making the allowances to the defendant so meager and insufficient. • Defendant was confronted with a grave criminal charge. She was an invalid and practically without means. She was, therefore, by reason of this pecuniary embarrassment, unable to procure the necessary means and witnesses; medical and otherwise, to clear herself of the awful charge that was made against her. It goes without saying that the sums allowed by the court were ’grossly inadequate and insufficient for any purpose.</p> <p>(1) While in divorce cases, it is the province of the appellate court to make its own deductions from tire evidence, independent of the findings of the trial court, yet where the evidence is conflicting and contradictory on material issues, the appellate court will defer largely to the findings of the court below, and will not disturb same unless it is made clearly to appear that manifest error has been committed in the conclusions reached by the trial court. King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454; Lawlor v. Lawlor, 76 Mo. App. 637; Munchow v. Munc