Quadarius Devonta Bufford v. State of Tennessee

In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jabriel Linzy, of first-degree murder,attempted first-degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of adangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the first degree murderconviction, fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years forthe conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Thetrial court ordered that the two shorter sentences be served consecutively to each other butconcurrently with the life sentence. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this courtaffirmed. State v. Linzy, No. E2016-01052-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3575871, at 1 (Tenn.Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017). The Petitioner fileda petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court grantedpost-conviction relief, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object toinadmissible social media evidence in conjunction with not eliciting testimony about thePetitioner's prior conflict with the victim and that trial counsel's performance prejudicedthe Petitioner. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred becausetrial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision when failing to object to the social mediaevidence and because the Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel's performanceprejudiced him. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The Petitioners, Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze, seek post-conviction relief from their respective convictions related to their infant son's death in 2000 from abusive head trauma ("AHT"). The post-conviction court afforded the Petitioners an evidentiary hearing at which they presented purported "new scientific evidence" through various experts in an effort to establish their actual innocence. The State, through the Office of the District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District ("District Attorney"), admitted the facts asserted by the Petitioners and agreed that the Petitioners were actually innocent of these offenses. Nonetheless, the post-conviction court determined that the Petitioners had failed to carry their burden of producing clear and convincing proof to establish their actual innocence, a determination which the Petitioners now challenge. On appeal, the State, through the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter ("Attorney General"), contends that the Petitioners failed to prove their actual innocence based on new scientific evidence, instead proffering only new opinions on previously presented evidence, which supports the post-conviction court's denial of relief. In addition to the underlying substantive merits of their actual innocence claims, the Petitioners also raise certain procedural issues: (1) whether review of Mr. Maze's appeal, which began as a motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition, is permissive or an appeal as of right; (2) whether Mrs. Maze's petition for post-conviction relief, her first, is time-barred; (3) whether the State improperly changed its position on appeal in violation of due process, judicial estoppel, and waiver; (4) whether the post-conviction court's ruling infringed upon prosecutorial discretion and violated the party-presentation principle; (5) whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Mrs. Maze relief without independent review of her actual innocence claim; and (6) whether this cas

Defendant, Montrell Reid, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for harassment and stalking, both Class A misdemeanors. Under the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At sentencing, the trial court denied Defendant's request for probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgments as to the denial of probation, but we remand for a determination of the percentage of service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-302(d).