Case Details
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- appeal
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Excerpt
Concerning a personal injury suit premised on negligence arising out of the collision of a city trash truck and a private vehicle in routine traffic, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that sovereign immunity did not protect the city against the plaintiff's negligence claims but was correct in determining that the city's employee was not so protected. In Virginia, sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from governmental functions, and the removal of trash, when undertaken by a municipality, is a governmental function. Consequently, the city is immune from liability for negligence in performing or in failing to perform this function. However, since at the time of the collision, the city's employee was engaged in ordinary driving in routine traffic, as opposed to collecting trash, and only the latter activity required him to exercise judgment and discretion in the operation of the trash truck beyond that involved in ordinary driving, sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff's negligence claims against him. The portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment holding that the city does not benefit from sovereign immunity is reversed, but the portion of its judgment holding that the trash truck driver employed by the city does not benefit from sovereign immunity is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case for trial in the circuit court.
What This Ruling Means
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
Similar Rulings
The language of the Virginia wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, specifically lists wages and salaries, but it does not expressly apply to commissions, and its context does not support an interpretation that extends the statute's protections to commissions. Resting its contrary conclusion on the remedial purpose of the statute, past decisions interpreting the term "wages" in other contexts, and an interpretation by an administrative agency contained in a field manual, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply to commissions. However, neither the plain meaning of the terms "wages" or "commissions," nor the use of the term wages in the context of Code § 40.1-29, suggests that the use of that term sweeps in the concept of "commissions," and contentions to the contrary, while compelling, are properly addressed to the legislature. Therefore, the most plausible reading of Code § 40.1-29 is that the General Assembly did not intend for the wage theft statute to apply to commissions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
In an interlocutory appeal brought by medical staffing companies concerning a physician-plaintiff's claim against them under the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act, Code § 40.1-27.3, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of their plea in bar to that claim because the alleged retaliatory action taken against the plaintiff -- removing her from the work schedule in March of 2021 -- took place more than one year prior to her filing suit on April 1, 2022. The fact that she only later discovered her injury to be greater than she first realized as a result of a June 2, 2021, termination letter confirming that the termination of her employment was effective as of March 3, 2021, is immaterial to when she first sustained that injury. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
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