Grant v. Commissioner of Correction

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of murder, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his second criminal trial counsel, S, did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel when he made a decision not to present the testimony of G, the petitioner's former girlfriend and mother of his child, who had offered alibi testimony at the petitioner's first criminal trial. Held: The habeas court correctly concluded, in light of all of the evidence, that S made a reasoned, strategic choice, after a thorough investigation, not to pre- sent both an alibi defense and a misidentification defense, as S investigated G as an alibi witness, considered her relationship to the petitioner, and determined that she would not make a good witness, and, instead, focused his defense on challenging the police investigation and the state's identifi- cation evidence. The habeas court did not err in its determination that S's conduct in failing to present an alibi defense at the petitioner's second criminal trial did not constitute deficient performance. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection of the respondent's counsel to a hypothetical question posed to an expert witness for the petitioner related to S's allegedly deficient performance, as the question could not reasonably be separated from the essence of the ultimate issue that was before the court, namely, whether the standard of care required S to present the alibi defense. Argued March 26, 2025—officially released February 10, 2026

The petitioner, who had previously pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed his habeas petition, which claimed that a prior habeas court had improperly denied his application for the appointment of counsel on appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the resolution of the petitioner's claim did not involve issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner, or that were adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further. The habeas court properly dismissed the habeas petition pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29 (2)) for failure to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted, as the petitioner's claim asking the second habeas court to review and address the validity and legal soundness of a prior habeas court's decision to deny the petitioner's request to appoint counsel on appeal was beyond the power and authority of the second habeas court, and the proper procedural vehicle to have challenged the first habeas court's determination should have been by a motion for review pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 63-7). Argued September 15—officially released December 9, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder and assault in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his underlying claims of error were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the peti- tioner failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the late filing of his habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), as the petitioner's argument essentially attacked the credibility determinations of the habeas court, and this court does not second-guess such credibility determinations on appeal. It would not have been an abuse of the habeas court's discretion to deny the petition for certification to appeal if the petitioner had included his claim that the habeas court improperly denied his request to appoint counsel for the good cause hearing, as this court could not conclude that the habeas court's failure to provide such counsel only for the limited purpose of the good cause hearing was the type of egregious defect or ''truly extraordinary situation'' warranting reversal under the plain error doctrine or that it threat- ened the integrity of the judicial system or public confidence in the judicial system such that this court was required to invoke its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to guarantee a right to counsel at any stage of a habeas proceeding. Argued March 18—officially released October 28, 2025

The plaintiff, a candidate for town council in the November, 2025 South Windsor municipal election, appealed from the trial court's judgment dis- missing his action brought pursuant to the statutes (§§ 9-328 and 9-371b) affording a candidate who is aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with a municipal election or referendum, respectively, expe- dited judicial review of his or her claims. In the November, 2025 municipal election, South Windsor electors approved, by way of referendum, several revisions to the South Windsor charter, one of which changed the maxi- mum number of individuals affiliated with a particular political party who could serve on the nine member town council from six individuals to a bare majority of five. During that election, electors also voted for town council candidates, with six Democratic Party candidates receiving more votes than any Republican Party candidate. The plaintiff received the sixth highest vote total of the Democratic candidates, and B received the fourth highest vote total of the Republican candidates. Following the election, the defendant, the South Windsor town clerk, determined that the bare majority charter revision, as approved in the referendum, applied to the 2025 town council election, even though the minutes from a meeting of the South Windsor Charter Revision Commission at which the commission proposed the bare majority charter revision indicated that the revision, if approved, would not take effect until the November, 2027 South Windsor municipal election. The town clerk thereupon issued a preliminary list of election winners, declaring that B, rather than the plaintiff, had won the final seat on the town council. The plaintiff claimed in the trial court that he was aggrieved by the town clerk's decision to apply the bare majority charter revision in determining which candidates had won the November, 2025 town council election. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's ac