In re L.D.

Permanent custody; case plan; failure to remedy; 12 out of 22 months; substance abuse; mental health; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to continue. Appellant requested the trial court to continue the permanent custody hearing because the guardian ad litem's report was untimely filed. Because the guardian ad litem was available for cross-examination and the report did not raise any new or surprising information, appellant was unable to show that she was prejudiced by the denial. The trial court did not err when it granted permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS; its decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The child had been in custody for more that 12 out of 22 months and a grant of permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Appellant completed portions of her case plan, which included housing, employment, mental health, substance abuse, and anger management but did not benefit from some of the services she received.

<bold>1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction — home state</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by declining jurisdiction over this child custody matter and by concluding that Vermont was the home state of the children, because: (1) the minor children were not living in North Carolina for the required six months prior to the commencement of plaintiff mother's custody proceedings, and except for a six-week period in January and February 2002, the minor children lived continuously in Vermont from August 2001 to July 2002; (2) the totality of circumstances shows the six-week absence was merely a temporary absence, and in light of the numerous relocations and decisions, the parties' intent at the specific time they retrieved the minor children standing alone should not control the determination of whether the absence was temporary; (3) the length of absence from Vermont was a relatively short period of time, especially when compared to the fact that the minor children had spent almost the entire previous year in Vermont; and (4) Vermont's exercise of jurisdiction is proper under both North Carolina's UCCJEA provisions and Vermont's UCCJA provisions.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody — notice —</bold> <bold>substantial conformity</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a child custody case when it found that Vermont had issued its order in substantial conformity with the UCCJA and that plaintiff mother had notice and was aware of the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction before the Vermont court on 18 September 2002, because: (1) plaintiff conceded that the notice of hearing stated in all capital letters that both parties must appear and failure to appear meant it was possible for the court to issue parental rights and responsibilities based on the evidence presented by the other party; and (2) plaintiff responded to defendant's motion and specifically raised

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent custody of an abused, neglected and dependent three-year-old to a children services agency. Clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that the child's best interest would be served by awarding permanent custody to the agency and allowing the child to remain in the care of the child's foster parents of more than two years, who were interested in adopting the child. The juvenile court also did not abuse its discretion by awarding legal custody of neglected and dependent 12- and two-year-old siblings to unrelated caregivers with whom both had lived for more than two years. The preponderance of evidence supported the court's determination that the children's best interest warranted remaining in their current home, which was able to address the children's particularized needs. Additionally, mother's trial attorney did not provide deficient representation by failing to make a hearsay objection to the foster mother's testimony about the three-year-old's medical diagnoses and prognoses, and the agency did not fail to make a reasonable effort at reunification before moving for permanent custody. Judgments affirmed.

<p>Appeal, No. 2, April T., 1920, by libellant, from order and decree of C. P. Cambria County, June T., 1919, No. 154, making absolute a rule for alimony and counsel fees pendente lite in the case of Daniel E. Swank v. Ada M. Swank.</p> <p>Libel in divorce. Before O’Connor, J.</p> <p>Petition for alimony and counsel fees, pendente lite.</p> <p>The court entered the following order:</p> <p>And now, March 17, 1920, the rule for alimony and costs pendente lite and counsel fees is made absolute, and it is ordered that the libellant pay unto William A. McGuire, Esquire, the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars as counsel fees, as well as fifty dollars monthly for respondent’s maintenance pendente lite and costs; the said maintenance pendente lite to date from October 1, 1919, and continue during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, or until further order of the court; the foregoing amounts to be paid to William A. McGuire, attorney for respondent, or until further order of the court; the foregoing amounts to be paid to William A. McGuire, attorney for respondent, on or before April 1, 1920.</p> <p>Error assigned was the order of the court.</p>