Claire Nicola Bell v. Timothy John Bell - Concurring

R.C. 3119.83 provides that, except as provided in R.C. 3119.84, a court may not retroactively modify an obligor's duty to pay a delinquent support payment. R.C. 3119.84 permits retroactive modification of child support only for the period between filing a motion for modification and a final order on the motion. Termination of an arrearage is a retroactive modification of child support. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion. Additionally, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father had not demonstrated a change of circumstances and that modification of custody was not in the children's best interests.

A district court has jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody determination, including visitation orders, when the child's home state is North Dakota and the child and parents no longer reside in the issuing jurisdiction. Appellate courts have the authority and duty to determine the applicability of relevant statutes to legal controversies, even when the parties do not identify those statutes or argue for their application. When a parent seeks to modify an existing nonparent visitation order, the court must apply the modification standards under the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act. When modifying an order granting nonparent visitation, the court must determine whether the nonparent rebutted in the initial proceeding the presumption that the parent's decision regarding visitation is in the child's best interest. If the nonparent rebutted the presumption in the initial proceeding, the presumption remains rebutted.

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion for modification of custody, seeking to relocate with the parties' minor child to Poughkeepsie, New York. Held that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for modifica- tion of custody: contrary to the defendant's contention that the trial court ignored the parties' informal agreement for alternating weekly parenting time with the child for the seven to eight months leading up to the hearing on the plaintiff's motion, that court heard extensive testimony from both parties as to that schedule, which the parties had in place during the unique circumstances of the child's remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic, and, now that in-person schooling had resumed, neither party sought a continuation of that schedule, the court's previous ex parte order recognized that alternating weekly parenting schedule, and the court's statement that it was in the child's best interests to maintain the continuity of living with his mother and his brother found support in the record as it reasonably could be construed as a reference to the parties' former parenting time schedule; moreover, the court's finding that the plaintiff had a more active role in the child's life was not clearly erroneous, as there was evidence in the record to support that finding, including the plaintiff's testimony that she primarily cared for the child from his birth and throughout his childhood, and the defendant's testimony that he had, at times, missed the child's doctor's appointments and parent-teacher conferences due to his work schedule; furthermore, the defendant did not point to any evidence to support his argument that the court prejudged the motion on the basis that the plaintiff already had moved to Poughkeepsie, and, to the contrary, the court applied the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-56

Mother appeals the trial court's decision to change custody to Father. Here, the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence in the record support the trial court's determination that naming Father the primary residential parent of the children is in their best interests. As such, we affirm.