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Jean Dedmon v. Debbie Steelman

Tenn.November 17, 2017No. W2015-01462-SC-R11-CVCited 31 times
Plaintiff WinDebbie Steelman

Case Details

Judge(s)
Justice Holly Kirby
Status
Published
Procedural Posture
appeal to Tennessee Supreme Court on certified question regarding application of collateral source rule

Related Laws

No specific laws identified for this ruling.

Outcome

Tennessee Supreme Court held that the collateral source rule applies in personal injury cases, allowing plaintiffs to recover full undiscounted medical bills as reasonable expenses and precluding defendants from introducing evidence of discounted insurance rates.

Excerpt

We granted this appeal to address whether our holding in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), applies in personal injury cases. We hold that it does not. West held that "reasonable charges" for medical services under Tennessee's Hospital Lien Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-22-101 to –107 (2012), are the discounted amounts a hospital accepts as full payment from patients' private insurers, not the full, undiscounted amounts billed to patients. West, 459 S.W.3d at 46. West defined "reasonable charges" in the context of interpreting the Hospital Lien Act, and its holding is limited to that Act. As an alternative argument, we are asked in this appeal to consider applying the principles in West to the determination of reasonable medical expenses in personal injury cases. Doing so involves the collateral source rule, which excludes evidence of benefits to the plaintiff from sources collateral to the tortfeasor and precludes the reduction of the plaintiff's damage award by such collateral payments. The rule is based on the principles that tortfeasors should be responsible for all of the harm they cause and that payments from collateral sources intended to benefit an injured party should not be used to reduce the liability of the party who inflicted the injury. After a thorough review of court decisions in Tennessee and across the country on the collateral source rule, we decline to alter existing law in Tennessee. We hold that the collateral source rule applies in this personal injury case, in which the collateral benefit at issue is private insurance. Consequently, the plaintiffs may submit evidence of the injured party's full, undiscounted medical bills as proof of reasonable medical expenses. Furthermore, the defendants are precluded from submitting evidence of discounted rates accepted by medical providers from the insurer to rebut the plaintiffs' proof that the full, undiscounted charges are reasonable. The defendants remain f

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Dismissed

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