No specific laws identified for this ruling.
The court granted the motion to dismiss regarding fire and EMS run records as moot after the district produced them. The court granted the motion to dismiss regarding unredacted Comstock invoices as moot but denied it as to redacted portions, requiring further review of redaction claims.
Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 1333.61 kept person responsible trade secret copyright grant application attorney-client moot. Overview: Requester sought copies of federal grant application forms filed by respondent fire district. Respondent claimed that the contents of the applications were not "records" of the fire district, or alternatively were trade secret and copyright interests held by the fire district and a privately contracted grant writer. The special master found that the applications were public records documenting the official activities of the fire district, and that the contents did not reveal any secret trade methodology. As technical writing to answer questions in an application form, the contents involved negligible creativity as a claimed "literary work." Requester's purpose qualified as "fair use" in any case. The special master recommended a finding that the contents of the grant applications did not fall under either the Ohio uniform trade secrets act, or federal copyright law. The special master found the that respondent had properly redacted the narrative portions of requested itemized attorney billing statements.
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
Civ.R. 56; motion for summary judgment; race discrimination; age discrimination; hostile work environment; retaliation. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that defendant unlawfully discriminated against her based on race and age because plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and the evidence presented showed that defendant terminated plaintiff's employment for a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose. Defendant was also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for hostile work environment because none of the evidence showed that the alleged harassment that plaintiff experienced was based upon race or age. Finally, defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for retaliation because plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation as plaintiff could not show a causal connection between her protected activity and the termination of her employment. Judgment for defendant.
Civ.R. 56, hostile work environment, constructive discharge. Plaintiff failed to produce a genuine issue as to any material fact that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race or national origin, or that he was constructively discharged. The alleged hostile actions and commentary made by other employees were not racially based and did not materially disrupt plaintiff's work. As plaintiff's experiences amounted to no more than ordinary tribulations of the workplace, plaintiff's hostile work environment claims failed. For the same reasons, plaintiff failed to sustain his constructive discharge claim. Summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant pursuant to Civ.R. 56.
Civ.R. 56; motion for summary judgment; University of Toledo Athletic Department; athletics; negligent misrepresentation; promissory estoppel; negligence; discretionary immunity. In an action where plaintiff was removed from University of Toledo's women's soccer team, the court found that defendant was entitled to discretionary immunity for the decision to remove plaintiff from the team. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant supplied false information to plaintiff that the document plaintiff signed was a National Letter of Intent, and therefore, plaintiff failed to satisfy all the elements of the claim. Defendant was also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel because the court found that plaintiff's relationship with University of Toledo was contractual in nature, and therefore, the claim failed as a matter of law. Defendant was further entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for negligence as the court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case for the claim since plaintiff pointed to no facts or supportive law that would allow the court to conclude that a duty of care existed to provide a safe team environment free from abuse, harassment, ridicule, embarrassment, and hostility. Judgment for defendant.
Motion for Summary Judgment, Employment, Age Discrimination, Sex Discrimination. No genuine issues as to any material fact existed regarding plaintiff's claims for age or sex discrimination. Defendant presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case by presenting facts which demonstrated that defendant's reasoning for termination of plaintiff's employment was pretextual. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment employment discrimination retaliation adverse employment action Family and Medical Leave Act. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for employment discrimination based on age and disability because plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of retaliation as plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim for retaliation since she could not show a causal connection between any alleged adverse employment action and her FMLA leave. Judgment for defendant.
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