Thornton v. Thornton

<p>Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court in Chancery, Fort Smith District.</p> <p>Edgar E. Bryant, Judge.</p> <p>STATEMENT BY THE COURT.</p> <p>The appellee, Ada Thornton, a minor, was the owner of a lot in the city of Fort Smith, which was included in an improvement district of said city. An assessment for the benefit of the improvement was made upon said lot, in common with the other lots embraced in the district. The assessment upon said lot was not paid, and in 1890 a suit was brought by the board of said improvement district, in the circuit court for the Fort Smith district, to collect the amount of said assessment. The lot had been assessed by the county assessor as the property of George Thornton, and the board of improvement alleged in their complaint that he was the owner of the lot, and named him as the defendant. At the time this suit was commenced, George Thornton, who was the father of appellee, Ada Thornton, had been dead several years. The board of improvement not knowing this, a summons was issued for said George Thornton, and the sheriff returned that he was not to be found in his county. Afterwards a copy of said summons was affixed to the property, and published as required by the statute in cases where the defendant is not found. Upon such service a decree was rendered condemning the lot to be sold for the assessment, penalty and costs. At the sale under such decree, the appellant, Greenstreet, purchased. The sale was duly confirmed, and, after the expiration of the time for redemption, a deed in due form was executed, conveying said land to him.</p> <p>This suit was brought by Ada Thornton to set aside such decree and sale, so far as it effects her interest, and to cancel the deed to Greenstreet. The chancellor held that the decree was void, and rendered a decree that Ada Thornton should return to Greenstreet the amount of the assessment paid by him, interest, etc., less rent collected by him, and that the deed be canceled.</p> <p>1. There is no d

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

<p>This case was decided by the court En Banc.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.</p> <p>Statement.</p> <p>On December 21st, 1908, John M. Prall brought in the circuit court for Hillsborough county, Florida, a suit in equity for a divorce from his wife Emma L. Prall. In the amended bill of complaint it is alleged that the couple were married April 3, 1895, at Fort Dodge, Iowa; that they lived together in Iowa and two children were born to them; that during their married life till he finally separated from her, the complainant was a faithful and devoted husband; that during their residence in Iowa the wife became enamored with a strange religious sect and a devotee at its altar; * * * that from the time of her conversion to the belief of this sect the defendant began to be estranged from the complainant because of his inability to join her in the adoption of the tenets of this religion;” that to please her he moved to Estero in Lee county, Florida, where the sect was established; that the wife “further yielding to the doctrine of this sect, which holds as one of its beliefs that the members of the sect or union are married in Christ and are not properly married to any one, withdrew herself from all marital relations with complainant, abjuring him in every way and telling him that his approaches were obnoxious to her; that she refused to * * * allow complainant the privileges of a husband; that during this time the respondent became more and more undutiful in her relations towards complainant, being enraged with complainant on account of his refusal to submit all of their property to be community property with the said religious society as aforesaid; thaf^lie constantly chided him upon his sinfulness and sought to estrange his children from him. Moreover complainant says that respondent ceased in every way to render services to him as a wife, and instead of extending to him courtesy and respect due a husband, maligned him and abused him in t