In Re Nehemiah H.

Dependency and Neglect—Allocation of Parental Responsibilities—Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The Mesa County Department of Human Services (Department) assumed temporary custody of 8-year-old M.S. and initiated a dependency and neglect proceeding. Mother lived in Texas. The court, by stipulation, adjudicated M.S. dependent or neglected. The Department then moved for a permanent allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for M.S. to mother. The magistrate determined it was in M.S.'s best interests to be placed with mother and issued an order granting permanent APR to mother. Father appealed, and a Court of Appeals' division dismissed for failure to obtain district court review. Father then filed a petition for district court review, which was denied, and he appealed again. Initially, the Court of Appeals addressed the Department's argument that the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) does not apply to dependency and neglect proceedings once a child has been adjudicated dependent and neglected. The UCCJEA does not exempt any stage of a dependency and neglect proceeding from its purview. The Court, sua sponte, concluded that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue the permanent APR order. Under the UCCJEA, the court that makes an initial custody determination generally retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. As a result, a Colorado court, absent temporary emergency jurisdiction, may only modify a custody order issued by an out-of-state court under limited circumstances. Here, a California court had issued a custody order before the initiation of the dependency and neglect proceeding. The magistrate did not confer with the California court that issued the custody order or make a determination as to whether the California court had lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Consequently, the magistrate failed to acquire jurisdiction under the UCCJEA before issuing t

Dependency and Neglect—Attorney–Client Privilege for Expert Report. Based on a report from neighbors, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and Families (the Division) removed the children in this case and placed them with their maternal grandfather, where they remained throughout the proceedings. The Division filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on the fact that mother left the 3-year-old twins home alone for over six hours. This family had been involved with child protective services on two prior occasions due to physical abuse and severe injuries to the children. Before the hearing, mother requested appointment of a child psychology expert to evaluate her parenting time. Because mother was indigent, the court appointed the expert at the state's expense. Based on the expert's report, mother elected not to call the expert as a witness, but the guardian ad litem (GAL) requested the expert's report. The juvenile court ordered the report disclosed and allowed the GAL to call the expert to testify at the termination hearing. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. The GAL subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parent–child relationships, and the court terminated mother's and father's parental rights. On appeal, mother argued that the juvenile court violated her attorney–client privilege when it required disclosure of the expert's report and admitted the report and the expert's testimony at the termination hearing. Under CRS § 19-3-610(1), when an indigent parent's attorney requests appointment of an expert, the attorney–client privilege generally protects communications between the parent and the expert. However, here much of the expert's report and testimony concerned observations of the children, and thus fell outside the privilege. In addition, the expert advised mother, orally and in writing, that the evaluation and interview would not be considered confidential a

Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and on its finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the child's best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A father was found to have committed severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect case. The Department of Children's Services subsequently filed a petition to terminate the father's parental rights based on the previous finding of severe child abuse. Father asserts that the trial court erred in failing to continue the termination proceedings in his absence, in finding a ground for termination of his parental rights, and in determining that termination was in the child's best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's decision.

The respondent mother appealed from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, I and D. The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, had filed petitions to terminate the respondent's parental rights after she admitted that she had sent sexually explicit photographs of I to several persons and after the children were adjudicated neglected, committed to the petitioner's custody, and placed in a preadoptive foster home. During the proceedings on the petitions, the respondent filed four separate motions for a continuance of the termination proceedings, asserting, inter alia, that a continuance was required so that she could testify in defense of the termination of her parental rights without jeopardizing her fifth amendment right to avoid incriminating herself in connection with a pending federal criminal proceeding in which she had been charged with certain federal crimes related to her distribution of the photographs of I. The trial court granted the first three motions, but denied the fourth. Following the termination trial, at which the respon- dent did not testify and the trial court did not draw any adverse inference against her due to her silence, the court rendered judgments terminating her parental rights. With respect to both petitions, the court found that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabili- tation, as required by the applicable statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)). With respect to the petition related to I, the court additionally found that, as the result of the respondent's conduct in distributing the sexually explicit photographs of I, I had been denied the care, guidance, or control necessary for that child's well-being for purposes of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C). The court further found that the petitioner had established that the seven factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k) weighed in favor o