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The trial court found the home improvement contract violated the Home Improvement Act and was unenforceable against the defendants. The defendants prevailed on their counterclaim for breach of contract and were awarded $21,720.34 in compensatory damages. The appellate court affirmed.
The plaintiff, who had been hired by the defendants to perform certain home construction site work, sought to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, after the defendants failed to make an installment payment under the parties' contract. The contract set forth a schedule of six installment payments. Work was scheduled to begin on March 9, 2015, and was to be completed on May 11, 2015. As a result of delays, work did not begin until May, 2015. In October, 2015, the plaintiff ceased working for the defendants; the plaintiff maintained that he was termi- nated whereas the defendants claimed the plaintiff walked off the job. The plaintiff claimed he was entitled to the fourth installment payment. The defendants then hired V Co. to complete the work. The plaintiff thereafter brought the present action seeking damages for the defen- dants' failure to remit the fourth installment payment. The defendants filed a counterclaim. Following a trial to the court, the trial court ren- dered judgment for the defendants on the complaint and on their counter- claim, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that the contract violated the Home Improvement Act (§ 20-418 et seq.) and was unenforceable against the defendants; the plaintiff failed to follow the statutorily (§ 42-135a (1) and (2)) prescribed language and form for the cancellation notice in the contract and failed to furnish the defendants with a detachable notice of cancellation as required by § 42-135a (2) and (3), and these failures amounted to material noncompliance with the act. 2. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff caused the delay in the completion of the work was not clearly erroneous; the court had before it the testimony of the defendants' expert regarding the percentage of work completed by the plaintiff and how much work was left to complete, which the court was free to credit, and the court did not have to credit the plaintiff's testimon
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motions to dismiss her retaliatory discharge action, which alleged a violation of the whistleblower statute (§ 31-51m). The plaintiff, while employed at a pizza restaurant owned by the defendant S Co. and managed by the defendant L, submitted a complaint to the local health district reporting unsanitary conditions at the restaurant. The day after a health inspector visited the restaurant and disclosed that the plaintiff had made the complaint, the defendants terminated her employment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the Department of Labor, as required by § 31-51m (c). Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff's action focused on her employer's con- duct in terminating her employment following her complaint to the health district, the substance of which related to public health, not occupational safety or health. Argued September 9—officially released December 16, 2025
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant town's motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging, inter alia, pregnancy discrimination. She claimed that the court erred in its determina- tion that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to her claims. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered adverse employment actions when the defendant failed to reinstate her to her original job or an equivalent one and when it failed to promote her following her return from maternity leave, and a rational fact finder could conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, including the timing and sequence of the alleged adverse employment actions, that the plaintiff pre- sented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and that the defendant's stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for its unlawful discrimination; accordingly, this court remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to gender discrimination and in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued October 15, 2024—officially released November 11, 2025
The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025
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