Breach of Contract Cases

This intellectual-property dispute between two companies based in California arises out of the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets that initially occurred in California some fifteen years ago. Defendant CrowdStrike, Inc. (CrowdStrike) filed a special appearance, which the Court grants. The Court holds that it lacks general jurisdiction over CrowdStrike because, despite having a large office and sales in Texas, Crowdstrike does not have its principal place of business in Texas and is not "essentially at home" here under the exceptional-case doctrine. The Court holds that it lacks specific jurisdiction over CrowdStrike because plaintiff's claims do not "arise out of or relate to" CrowdStrike's Texas contacts, which occurred years after the initial alleged misappropriation and are peripheral to, rather than substantially connected to, the operative facts of the case. Granting an application for a temporary injunction against the defendant (the plaintiff's former employee) based on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim with respect to a non-compete agreement and reforming the scope of services covered by the non-compete agreement. Denying temporary injunctive relief based on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim with respect to a customer non-solicit agreement, a worker non-solicit agreement, and a confidentiality agreement. Denying temporary injunctive relief with respect to alleged TUTSA violations. Granting the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction against the plaintiff's derivative claims on entities' behalf for lack of standing because the plaintiff was no longer a member of the entities when he filed suit. This opinion addresses the division of settlement funds and the entitlement to reimbursement of litigation expenses arising from a prior lawsuit. The settlement funds were placed in an escrow account in 2024 pending the resolution of the present dispute. Denying a motion to remand the case back to district court because the alleged agreement in the case plain

Appellant challenges a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a plea of sovereign immunity filed by a separately incorporated subsidiary of the Chesapeake Hospital Authority (the "Authority") in response to claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with appellant's employment agreement with one of its physicians. For the reasons explained in this opinion, it is concluded on the present appeal that the circuit court erred in sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Breach of contract; unjust enrichment; void; R.C. 4735.02; weight of the evidence; damages; R.C. 2323.51; frivolous conduct. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by concluding that an enforceable contract existed based on the claims asserted in the complaint and at trial for damages stemming from a breach of the agreement, and the trial court's determination that the plaintiff failed to prove damages was not against the weight of the evidence. And finally, because the plaintiff failed to file a motion for attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51, no claim for fees was preserved.

DEFAMATION PER SE – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE – BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT – QUALIFED PRIVILEGE – ACTUAL MALICE – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – DERIVATIVE CLAIMS – NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL: Where plaintiff former employee sued his former employer for defamation, the trial court erred in finding that the former employer's statements were protected under qualified privilege where the court improperly determined that the privilege applied based on the employer-employee relationship and did not fully consider the remaining elements of the qualified-privilege standard, and the court erred in instructing the jury that it had to find actual malice in order to find in favor of plaintiff on his defamation claim. The trial court erred in determining that plaintiff former employee's breach-of-contract claim against his former employer was derivative of his defamation claim where the contract claim fell under a separate settlement contract between the parties. Where plaintiffs' witness lacked firsthand knowledge of the statements about which he sought to testify, he lacked the personal knowledge required by Evid.R. 602. Where plaintiff could not definitively identify the caller, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about a phone call. Where defendant-appellee failed to file a notice of cross-appeal but sought to assert a cross-assignment of error to change the trial court's judgment, the cross-assignment of error must be dismissed.