Wage Theft Cases

second opinion evaluation, temporary partial disability, wage records

A group of employees filed an action against the Commonwealth and the Department of Corrections, seeking to recover for unpaid overtime under a statute enacted in 2021 providing a right for such recovery. When the General Assembly comprehensively overhauled the statute shortly after its enactment, however, it repealed the waiver of sovereign immunity. The present action was filed after the General Assembly repealed the original waiver of sovereign immunity. In response to the complaint, the Commonwealth filed a plea of sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the plea, and the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal to this Court under Code §§ 8.01-626 and 8.01-670.2. The issue is treated as one implicating subject matter jurisdiction, and in the present appeal the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and final judgment is entered in favor of the Commonwealth.

The plaintiff, Clifton Peasley (plaintiff or Peasley), appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his action for declaratory relief, which sought, inter alia, a decree that he was entitled to back pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine. In this respect, it was undisputed that before commencing the action for declaratory relief, the plaintiff had filed a grievance seeking back pay, which proceeding remained pending in arbitration. Peasley's efforts to compare the provisions of the Teachers' Tenure Act with the landmark antidiscrimination protections discussed in Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147 (R.I. 2014), was unavailing. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

NCWHA, UDTP, severance payment, non-compete payment

The language of the Virginia wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, specifically lists wages and salaries, but it does not expressly apply to commissions, and its context does not support an interpretation that extends the statute's protections to commissions. Resting its contrary conclusion on the remedial purpose of the statute, past decisions interpreting the term "wages" in other contexts, and an interpretation by an administrative agency contained in a field manual, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply to commissions. However, neither the plain meaning of the terms "wages" or "commissions," nor the use of the term wages in the context of Code § 40.1-29, suggests that the use of that term sweeps in the concept of "commissions," and contentions to the contrary, while compelling, are properly addressed to the legislature. Therefore, the most plausible reading of Code § 40.1-29 is that the General Assembly did not intend for the wage theft statute to apply to commissions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.