Harassment Cases

Defendant, Montrell Reid, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for harassment and stalking, both Class A misdemeanors. Under the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At sentencing, the trial court denied Defendant's request for probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgments as to the denial of probation, but we remand for a determination of the percentage of service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-302(d).

Convicted, after a jury trial, of harassment in the second degree and criminal violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. She claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions because the state failed to establish that the victim, V, had received harassing and alarming phone calls, texts and mailings, and that she was responsible for any such harassing communications. Held: This court concluded that, although the defendant was prosecuted under the wrong revision of the statute (§ 53a-183 (a)) proscribing harassment in the second degree, that impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The revision of the statute ((Rev. to 2021) § 53a-183 (a), as amended by Public Acts 2021, No. 21-56, § 5) under which the defendant was prosecuted imposed a more onerous evidentiary burden on the state, in that it required proof that the defendant's conduct had caused terror or intimidation, whereas the applicable revision of the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 53a-183 (a)) required communication with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm, and, as the trial court's jury instruction under the incorrect revision of the statute was con- siderably more favorable to the defendant than the correct jury instruction would have been, and because the defendant had full and fair notice of the nature of the charges and her allegedly unlawful conduct, this court was satisfied that the erroneous jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant. The defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of harassment in the second degree was without merit, as it was reasonable and logical for the jury to find, given the sheer volume of her unwelcome and incessant contacts, in which she threatened to "ruin" V's life and make it "a living hell," that she repeatedly had contacted V for the purpose of harassing and causing him alarm and that she made those contacts in a manner likely to cause him such alarm. The evidence was suffici

Appellant challenges the district court's grant of a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that his conduct was not objectively unreasonable and did not have a substantial adverse effect on respondent that was objectively reasonable. We affirm.

In this dispute related to a harassment restraining order (HRO), pro se appellant argues that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Because the district court did not err in determining that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant, we affirm.

In this appeal from an order denying a motion to reopen a harassment-restraining-order (HRO) proceeding pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion. Because the district court acted within its discretion by denying his motion to reopen, we affirm.

Domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO"); menacing by stalking; mental distress; sufficiency of the evidence; abuse of discretion; manifest weight of the evidence; scope of DVCPO. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee ("Petitioner") against respondent-appellant ("Respondent"). Respondent appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the DVCPO, the order was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the scope of the DVCPO was overbroad. The lower court's issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented. The evidence presented at the full hearing demonstrated that on one occasion, while on a Facetime call, Respondent made what could be considered a threat to Petitioner. A few months later, while Petitioner and Respondent were taking their son to a therapy appointment, Respondent raised his voice at Petitioner, eventually calling her a "cunt." The situation escalated to a point wherein security was contacted by Petitioner. Petitioner also presented evidence that Respondent, a licensed attorney in Ohio, kept filing legal motions and instructing the clerk of courts to serve Petitioner with them, even after he received a cease-and-desist letter from Petitioner's place of employment and after Petitioner obtained counsel. The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a protection order was necessary. The lower court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. With respect to the scope of the DVCPO, the court held that the order was tailored to prevent future harassment of Petitioner from Respondent. The order listed only the Petitioner as the protected person under the DVCPO. Respondent's children were not listed as protected persons. As such, Respondent was still allowed to parent his children during his allotted parenting time as set forth under the custody arrangement.

Appellant challenges the district court's grant of a former romantic partner's petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against him. Because the district court did not clearly err in its findings and did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were reasonable grounds to believe that appellant's behavior constituted harassment, we affirm.

Appellant Warren Black demanded an evidentiary hearing to challenge a petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) filed by respondent Karla Mitchell. The district court granted the HRO, reasoning that Black had violated active HROs by harassing Mitchell at least three times. Black asks us to reverse the district court's decision granting the HRO request. We affirm because the record supports the district court's finding that Black engaged in following, monitoring, or pursuing Mitchell in violation of existing HROs, Black's due-process rights were vindicated, and the district court acted within its discretion in fashioning the HRO.