In Re Sophia S.

<bold>1. Child Abuse and Neglect — adjudication of neglect — clear, cogent, and</bold> <bold>convincing evidence</bold> <block_quote> Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that a child did not receive proper care and supervision and that the neglect was likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional impairment or a substantial risk of such impairment.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Abuse and Neglect — findings — use of psychological evaluations</bold> <bold>and reports from GAL and social worker</bold> <block_quote> The trial court's extensive adjudicatory and dispositional findings in a child neglect proceeding showed that the court made its own determination of the facts and did not simply adopt reports from a social worker and the guardian ad litem and psychological evaluations. A court may consider written reports and make findings based on these reports so long as it does not broadly incorporate them as its findings.</block_quote> <bold>3. Child Abuse and Neglect — reunification efforts — futility — no one to</bold> <bold>supervise respondents</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a child neglect proceeding by ceasing reunification efforts where the findings supported the conclusion that continued reunification efforts would be futile.</block_quote> <bold>4. Child Abuse and Neglect — neglect — termination of visitation</bold> <block_quote> The termination of respondent mother's visitation was the result of a reasoned decision where it was supported by the findings and the evidence. The mother's parental rights to a sibling had been terminated and the parents had not made progress in working with DSS to parent this child.</block_quote> <bold>5. Appeal and Error — appealability — temporary dispositional order</bold> <block_quote> Respondent father is not entitled to appeal a temporary dispositional order in a child neglect proceeding. N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-1001</cross_reference>(a)(3) spe

Dependency and Neglect—Attorney–Client Privilege for Expert Report. Based on a report from neighbors, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and Families (the Division) removed the children in this case and placed them with their maternal grandfather, where they remained throughout the proceedings. The Division filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on the fact that mother left the 3-year-old twins home alone for over six hours. This family had been involved with child protective services on two prior occasions due to physical abuse and severe injuries to the children. Before the hearing, mother requested appointment of a child psychology expert to evaluate her parenting time. Because mother was indigent, the court appointed the expert at the state's expense. Based on the expert's report, mother elected not to call the expert as a witness, but the guardian ad litem (GAL) requested the expert's report. The juvenile court ordered the report disclosed and allowed the GAL to call the expert to testify at the termination hearing. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. The GAL subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parent–child relationships, and the court terminated mother's and father's parental rights. On appeal, mother argued that the juvenile court violated her attorney–client privilege when it required disclosure of the expert's report and admitted the report and the expert's testimony at the termination hearing. Under CRS § 19-3-610(1), when an indigent parent's attorney requests appointment of an expert, the attorney–client privilege generally protects communications between the parent and the expert. However, here much of the expert's report and testimony concerned observations of the children, and thus fell outside the privilege. In addition, the expert advised mother, orally and in writing, that the evaluation and interview would not be considered confidential a

<bold>1. Child Abuse and Neglect — delay in adjudicatory hearing — no</bold> <bold>prejudice</bold> <block_quote> It is much more difficult to show prejudice from delays in juvenile adjudicatory hearings where parental status is not in issue than in hearings on the termination of parental rights; a sharp distinction must be drawn between the focus of those hearings. Here, respondents did not show prejudice as the result of any delay in holding a juvenile adjudicatory hearing where the presiding judge had entered numerous continuances.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Abuse and Neglect — conclusion of neglect — supported by</bold> <bold>evidence</bold> <block_quote> The conclusion that a juvenile was neglected was supported by the mother's admission that she had used cocaine for at least two months prior to his birth, she and the child had tested positive for cocaine at the time of birth, there was evidence of domestic violence between respondents, the mother refused to sign a second Safety Assessment Plan, and she also refused to<page_number>Page 85</page_number> agree to remain in the home of the grandmother to ensure the child's safety.</block_quote> <bold>3. Child Abuse and Neglect — neglect and dependency — no separate</bold> <bold>findings about father — status of child in issue</bold> <block_quote> The issue at an adjudication and disposition stage is the status of the juvenile and not the assignment of culpability; there was no merit to the contention here that the trial court erred by not making findings as to the father regarding neglect and dependency of the child.</block_quote> <bold>4. Child Abuse and Neglect — adjudication of dependency" findings —</bold> <bold>ability of parent to provide care — availability of alternate care</bold> <block_quote> An adjudication of dependency was reversed and remanded for findings as to the ability of the parent to provide care or supervision and the availability of alternate child care arrangements.</b

<bold>1. Constitutional Law — effective assistance of counsel — tardiness</bold> <block_quote> Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding even though his counsel was late on the second of five days of hearing after a lunch recess, because: (1) respondent failed to demonstrate how his attorney's tardiness caused him to be denied a fair hearing; and (2) there was no way of determining what respondent's attorney was precluded from asking based on her failure to make an offer of proof as required by N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 103.</block_quote> <bold>2. Evidence — hearsay — mental health records of children</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by admitting, over objection, mental health records of two of the minor children, because: (1) even assuming arguendo that the records contain inadmissible hearsay, in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge disregarded any incompetent evidence that may have been admitted unless it affirmatively appears that he was influenced thereby; and (2) respondent has not pointed to any specific instances of hearsay upon which the trial court improperly relied.</block_quote> <bold>3. Termination of Parental Rights — past abuse — reasonable probability</bold> <bold>of continued abuse — emotional and behavioral problems</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent father's parental rights, because: (1) the trial court found that all three children had been abused and exhibited symptoms of that abuse, and respondent admitted that he physically<page_number>Page 279</page_number> beat and abused the children; (2) the court determined there was a reasonable probability that respondent would again abuse the children if they were returned to his care based on the testimony of respondent's individual therapist; (3) the children's therapist test

<bold>Termination of Parental Rights — failure to appoint</bold> <bold>guardian ad litem to parent — mental illness</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by failing to appoint respondent mother a guardian ad litem under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-1111</cross_reference>(a)(6) when she has a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder with possible psychotic disorder, because: (1) the trial court referenced respondent's mental wellbeing<page_number>Page 154</page_number> and its concern that respondent was unable to raise the minor children without assistance repeatedly in its written orders before and after receiving respondent's psychological evaluations; (2) it was the court's repeated findings that respondent was incapable of parenting her minor children based upon her mental illness in addition to respondent's own motion that triggered the requirement for appointment of a guardian ad litem; and (3) while respondent may be competent for some purposes, including her ability to assist counsel and maintain employment, it does not necessarily follow that she is not debilitated by her mental illness when it comes to parenting her children.</block_quote> <bold>2. Termination of Parental Rights — extraordinary</bold> <bold>delay in entering order — prejudicial error</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by delaying entry of an order until almost one year after completion of the hearing even though N.C.G.S. §§ <cross_reference>7B-1109</cross_reference>(e) and <cross_reference>7B-1110</cross_reference>(a) set the deadline no later than thirty days following the completion of the hearing, and the case is reversed, because: (1) the Court of Appeals has been apt to find prejudice in delays more than six months or more; (2) the need to show prejudice diminishes as the delay between the termination hearing and the date of entry of the order terminating parental rights increase