No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Trial court held the town could require plaintiff to transition to Medicare but must subsidize Medicare Part B premiums. Town appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed the judgment.
The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the town and retired on disability in 1986 after sustaining an injury in the course of his employment. In 1985, the town had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union in which the plaintiff was member. At that time, federal law did not permit municipal employees to enroll in Medicare, but the law was amended thereafter to permit or require municipal employees to participate in Medicare. The 1985 collective bargaining agreement provided that union members who retired due to disability would be entitled to town paid private health insurance. In 2016, the year after the plaintiff reached the age of sixty-five, the town informed him that he would be required to enroll in Medicare and to pay the cost of his Medicare Part B premiums. The plaintiff claimed that the town was bound to provide him with town paid private health insurance under the collective bargaining agreement or, alternatively, that it was obligated to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Follow- ing a trial, the court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement did not bar the town from requiring that the plaintiff transition to Medi- care, so long as the Medicare plan did not substantially reduce the benefits provided. The court also concluded, however, that the town was bound to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Thereafter, the town appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the collective bargaining agree- ment did not preclude the town from terminating the private health insurance in which the plaintiff was enrolled and requiring him to transi- tion to Medicare coverage: the collective bargaining agreement did not specifically require that the plaintiff be placed, and that he remain, on the same health insurance plan as the town's
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-293 (a)), an injured employee may assert a claim against and recover damages from a tortfeasor who is allegedly liable for the employee's work-related injury, even if the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for that injury, and an employer that has paid or has become obligated to pay those benefits to the employee "shall have a lien upon any judgment . . . or any settlement received by the employee from the [tortfeasor]." The plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate and as the decedent's surviving spouse, had filed for workers' compensation benefits after the decedent died of mesothelioma, which was caused in substantial part by his exposure to products containing asbestos during the course of his employ- ment with the defendants, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the town of Manchester. Prior to filing her claims for benefits, the plaintiff settled numerous product liability actions that she had brought against the manu- facturers and suppliers of the products containing asbestos to which the decedent had been exposed, with 70 percent of the net settlement proceeds awarded to the decedent's estate as damages for his personal injuries and death, and 30 percent of the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff for her loss of consortium. With respect to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, an administrative law judge of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, both at home and during the course of his employment with the defendants, was a significant factor in causing the decedent to develop mesothelioma. Because the decedent's meso- thelioma was caused in substantial part by this exposure to asbestos during his employment, total incapacity benefits were awarded to the decedent's estate and survivor's benefits were awarded to the plaintiff. The administra- tive law judge determined, however, that the defendants, as the decedent's e
Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no
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