EEOC Authority to Order Federal Agency to Pay for Breach of Settlement Agreement

The trial court improperly accorded claim-preclusive effect to appellant's R.C. 4112.02 retaliation claim based upon the District Court's judgment of dismissal. The District Court's decision dismissing appellant's Title VII retaliation claim \with prejudice\ for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, on the unique procedural facts of this case, did not serve to bar appellant from pursuing a R.C. 4112.02 retaliation claim in state court. The District Court's judgment did not meet the first element of res judicata/claim preclusion as it was not a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee as to the retaliation claim. However, the trial court properly accorded claim-preclusive effect to appellant's R.C. 4112.02 race discrimination claim based upon the District Court's judgment of dismissal. The judgment met all the elements of res judicata/claim preclusion. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee as to the race discrimination claim. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. Judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. Case is remanded to the trial court.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject . . . any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the . . . laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . mental disability [or] physical disability . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64 (a) (1)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . intellectual disability [or] mental disability . . . .'' The defendant M filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities, on behalf of his minor child, A, alleging that the plaintiff board of education had discriminated against A on the basis of A's mental disability. A, who had been diagnosed with several mental and cognitive disorders, attended a public magnet school, where he initially was enrolled as a special education student who was entitled to an individualized education plan and special accommodation services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). The school subsequently determined, against the wishes of A's parents, that A would no longer be designated as a special education student under the IDEA. Thereafter, A sustained a concussion during an incident at school, and A's parents kept A out of school until he was symptom free on the basis of the recommendation of A's physician. During A's absence, the board sent a habitual truancy notice to A's parents and held a planning and placement team meeting, which was attended by M and various representatives of the board, among other individuals, to discuss A's eligibility for special education services. At that meeting, M attempted to offer a letter from A's physician regarding A's post-concussion syndrome, but the board declined to accept

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee] shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs.'' The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec- tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from her residence. G claimed that the branch's misconduct violated the employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G's claim under § 46a-58 (a), insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The trial court properly granted defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss the federal discrimination claims pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant failed to advance a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

CIVIL-DISMISSAL-FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM-FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968/TITLE VIII-OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-SEXUAL HARASSMENT-INTENTIONAL TORT-AGENCY-AIDED BY AGENCY-VICARIOUS LIABILITY-DIRECT LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE-NEGLIGENT HIRING AND/OR SUPERVISION - Appellant's counterclaim failed to sufficiently plead claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment harassment under the Fair Housing Act under traditional principles of vicarious liability based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior involving the aided-by-agency theory of vicarious liability. Appellee was not liable for the intentional torts of its employee under a scope-of-employment analysis. Appellant's counterclaim also failed to sufficiently plead direct liability claims for negligent hiring and/or supervision.