Skip to main content

Collins v. Chartiers V. Gas Co.

Unknown CourtJanuary 6, 1890Cited 42 times

Case Details

Judge(s)
Clark, Green, McCollum, Mitchell, Paxson, Sterrett, Williams
Status
Published
Procedural Posture
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Allegheny County to Supreme Court (October Term 1889; cases consolidated from April Term 1888)

Related Laws

No specific laws identified for this ruling.

Outcome

Appeals by two plaintiffs from lower court decisions in trespass actions against Chartiers Valley Gas Company for negligent damage to water wells caused by natural gas drilling operations. Cases were consolidated and tried together.

Excerpt

<p>APPEALS BY PLAINTIFFS FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 2 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.</p> <p>Nos. 177, 204 October Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, Nos. 157, 509 April Term 1888, C. P. No. 2.</p> <p>To No. 157 April Term 1888, of the court below, Nannie R. Collins brought trespass against the Chartiers Valley Gas Company to recover damages for an injury to a water well owned by the plaintiff, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. To No. 509 of the same term Mary L. Osbon brought a similar action against the same defendant to recover for a like injury.</p> <p>The two cases having been put at issue, they were tried together on May 6, 1889, when the following facts were shown:</p> <p>Each of the plaintiffs is the owner of a small lot of ground, with a house thereon, situate in the borough of Glenfield in Allegheny county. On each of said lots is a well used to supply water for domestic uses on the premises. On June 7,1887, the defendant, being engaged in the business of producing and supplying natural gas, entered into a written contract with C. J. Hummel, by which Hummel engaged to drill a well for natural gas upon a “ location ” in the borough of Glenfield, distant about 100 feet from the water'well of one of the plaintiffs, and about 125 feet from that of the other. The contract provided that Hummel should encase said gas well with eight and one fourth inch casing to the depth of 700 feet, and deep enough to shut off all fresh water, and below that with six inch casing to shut off any water or caving rock found just above the gas rock, and should warrant the well absolutely free from water and do all work to the satisfaction of the defendant’s superintendent ; all tools, and gas and Avater connections, to be furnished by Hummel, and all casing required for the well to be furnished by the defendant. The contract contained also the following clause: “ All springs to be fully protected from damage, and drillings to be carried from the wells

Similar Rulings

Bell v. Land Title Guarantee Co
COLOCTAPPMay 2018

Buy and Sell Contract—Mineral Rights—Warranty Deed—Negligence—Breach of Contract—Statute of Limitations—Third Party—Cause of Action—Accrual Date. The Bells hired Orr Land Company LLC (Orr) and its employee Ellerman to represent them in selling their real property. Orr found a buyer and the Bells entered into a buy and sell contract with the buyer, which provided, as pertinent here, that the sale excluded all oil, gas, and mineral rights in the property. Orr then retained Land Title Guarantee Company (Land Title) to draft closing documents, including the warranty deed. In 2005 the Bells signed the warranty deed and sold the property to the buyer. The Bells didn't know that the warranty deed prepared by Land Title didn't contain any language reserving the Bells' mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. For over nine years, the Bells continued to receive the mineral owner's royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease on the property. In 2014 the lessee oil and gas company learned that the Bells didn't own the mineral rights, so it began sending the payments to the buyer. After that, the Bells discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. In 2016 the Bells filed this negligence and breach of contract action against defendants Land Title, Orr, and Ellerman. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bells' claims were untimely because the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Bells contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss because they sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish that the statute of limitations didn't begin to accrue on their claims until the oil and gas company ceased payment in September 2014, which is when they contended they discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights. A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years

Defendant Win
Kahn
Cal. SupremeAug 2003
Plaintiff Win
Austin B. v. Escondido Union School District
Cal. Ct. App.Apr 2007
Defendant Win
Frank Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
8th CircuitJan 2004
Plaintiff Win
Scheffler
La.Feb 2007
Defendant Win

Facing something similar at work?

Court rulings like this one are useful, but every situation is different. Take 2 minutes to see which laws may protect you — it's free, private, and no account is required to start.

This ruling information is sourced from public court records via CourtListener.com. It is provided for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.