Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co.

<p>Appeal from Fannin. Tried below before Hon. D. H. Scott,</p> <p>On the-day of December, 1876, appellants filed a suit in the district court of Fannin county for recovery of an undivided interest in land in controversy.</p> <p>On September 6, 1880, Margaret Boone and her husband, J. W. Boone, Olive T. Wainscott and her husband, Thomas J. Wainscott, and Jacob H. Humphrey, filed their fifth amended petition in the district court of Fannin, county against Harvey B. Cobb, John Hulsey and many others, for their, appellants’, undivided interest in the Daniel Davis league and labor of land.</p> <p>In said petition appellants allege that in December, 1874, they were seized and possessed of said land in their own right as follows, respectively: Margaret Boone, of an undivided interest of one-half and said Olive T. Wainscott and Jacob H. Humphrey, each of an undivided interest of one-eighth in the said Daniel Davis league and labor of land. That on December -, 1874, the appellees expelled appellants therefrom. That there were many farms on said land and the appellees had used and cultivated the cleared land for their own use and appropriated all the rents and profits thereof since and for years before the commencement of this suit and withheld from appellants their share in same. That the rents and profits were of the value of twenty thousand dollars, and that appellants had been thereby damaged ten thousand dollars. That appellees cut down and used a large number of trees growing upon said land of the value of and to appellant’s damage ten thousand dollars.</p> <p>That appellants, Margaret and Daniel Davis, were married in Texas in 1834 and lived together as such and were reputed to be and were man and wife in Texas from that time until the death of Daniel Davis, which took place in 1838.</p> <p>That they were, both of them, residents of Texas at and before their marriage and continued to be so, the said Daniel Davis until his death, in 1838, and the said Margaret until th

<p>Appeal, No. 263, Jan. T., 1896, by plaintiffs, from decree of C. P. Lackawanna Co., Sept. T., 1894, No. 5, on bill in equity.</p> <p>Bill in equity praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from mining coal under certain lands claimed by plaintiffs. Before Gunster, J.</p> <p>The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Error assigned■ was in dismissing bill.</p> <p>It is well settled by numerous authorities both in this state and in England that, where a severance of the surface from the underlying strata of coal or other minerals has taken place, no possession of the surface constitutes any possession of the underlying strata: Plummer v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 160 Pa. 483 Kingsley y. Hillside C. & I. Co., 144 Pa. 618; 1 Am. & Eng. Eney. of Law, 262; Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 34 Me. 172; Caldwell y. Copeland, 37 Pa. 431.</p> <p>Title to any of the minerals, quite distinct from the title to the surface, may be shown by documentary evidence; in the absence of such evidence, or in opposition to it, title to them may be made out by proof of possession and acts of ownership under the statute of limitations. The acts of ownership, however, which constitute possession and confer title must be distinct from such as are exercised over the surface: Tyrwhitt v. Wynne, 2 Barn. & Aid. 554; Cullen v. Rich, Buller, N. P. 102; Rich v. Johnson, 2 Strange, 1142; Caldwell v. Copeland, 87 Pa. 427; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284; MacSwinney on Mines, 526; Tliew v. Wingate, 10 B. & S. 714; McDonnell v. McKinty, 30 Ir. L. R. 514; Dartmouth v. Spittle, 19 W. R. 445 ; Ashton v. Stock, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 726; Seaman y. Yawdrey, 16 Yes. 392; Barnes v. Mawson, 1 M. & Sel. 84.</p> <p>To constitute a continuous possession of mines, it is only necessary that the operations be prosecuted as continuously as the nature of the business and the custom of the country permit: Stephenson y. Wilson, 50 Wis. 95; Wilson v. Henry, 40 Wis. 594.</p> <p>This was an ejectmen

<p>MOTION for a new trial.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment for a lot of land in city of New-Iiaven. The suit was commenced on _ the 9th of November, 1808.</p> <p>The defend^1 pleaded the general issue; and on the trial, the case appeared to be as follows: Josiah Wood-house died seised of the premises m 1766; and on his death, the same descended to his only son Robert, who centered thereon, and died seised thereof in 1775; and on his death the same descended to Mary Woodhouse, his «nly child, who was born in December, 1774, and who intermarried with James Goldear in 1794, before she arrived at the age of twenty-one years. She remained a feme covert until her death, which happened in November, 1807, leaving her husband, James Goldear, living, and having had children by him, born alive, who died before their mother, and who could have inherited the premises, if they had been alive at the time of her decease. Goldear had never been in actual possession of the premises; but the defendant, more than twenty years before the commencement of this action, having purchased the premises for a valuable consideration, went immediately into possession of the same, and from that time down to the time of trial, held the same adversely to all others. Mary had never been in possession since her intermarriage with Goldear. Josiah Woodhouse left at his death no brother, nor any issue of a brother; and he never had but one sister, Elizabeth, who died before the commencement of this suit, leaving the plaintiffs her only heirs at law. It also appeared that there were nine other persons living in equal degree of kindred to Mary Goldear with the plaintiffs. On these facts the plaintiff's claimed that they were entitled to recover. The defendant objected to a recovery, on the ground that Goldear being now living was tenant by the curtesy of the premises, though neither he nor his wife had ever been in actual possession during the coverture. And the court directed the jury, on that grou

<p>Appeal from Gonzales. The case was tried before Hon. Fielding Jones, one of the district judges.</p> <p>This was an action of trespass to try title, and was originally instituted by E: W. Perry, in the District Court of Lavaca county. The property in controversy was a league and labor of land lying in the latter county. The petition was filed on the 15th of April, 1856, against C. Ballard and some ten other persons as defendants. The plaintiff’s title will be found sufficiently described in the case of Howard v. Perry, 7 Tex., 259, in which case the present plaintiff was the defendant. Howard and wife, the plaintiffs in that suit, were made defendants in this, and it was alleged in the petition that the other defendants claimed under them. The case in 7 Texas shows the character of the imperfect grant to Hibbins, under which the Howards claimed, and of which mention is made by the court in this case.</p> <p>The case, as there decided, turned upon the inchoate of imperfect character of the Hibbins grant, and it is one of the precedents which holds, that such grants were at most but equities against the conscience of the body politic, and not titles which were recognized by the constitution and laws of the republic of Texas, so as to give them judicial standing in the courts. (Paschal’s Dig., Note 150, p. 40.) It was then also decided, that the chief clerk of the general land office, in the absence of the commissioner, &c., may certify an archive or record in the general land office; and that, having certified, the presumption is that the contingency contemplated by the statute existed. (Id., Note 209, p. 72.) A point was also decided in reference to the equities of settlers and locators. (Id., Note 985, p. 722.) And it was also here first ruled, that the printed hook of recommended certificates, if published by authority, may he evidence for some purposes, hut does not furnish the proof upon which the surveyor is required to act; but that the act is directory, and