American Stay Co. v. Delaney
Case Details
- Judge(s)
- Braley
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- Appeal from final decree dismissing bill in equity; prior appeal of motion to recommit master's report
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Outcome
The court dismissed the plaintiff's bill in equity seeking to enjoin a former employee from using trade secrets and seeking an accounting of salary. The interlocutory and final decrees dismissing the bill were affirmed on appeal.
Excerpt
<p>Bill in equity, filed in the Superior Court on June 14, 1910, and afterwards amended, in which the plaintiff, a corporation engaged extensively in the business of manufacturing and selling leather welting used in the manufacture of shoes, and a successor of the Union Welting Company, sought to enjoin the defendant, who since 1897 continuously had been in the employ of the plaintiff and its predecessor, from disclosing or making use of trade secrets alleged to belong to the plaintiff, the plaintiff averring that the defendant had obtained knowledge thereof in the course and by reason of his confidential employment. There also was a prayer for an accounting from the defendant and a return of the whole or a part of the salary paid to him in the last year and a half of his employment, the plaintiff averring that during that period, while drawing full pay from the plaintiff, the defendant was giving a large part of his time, energy and attention to the construction and equipment of a rival manufactory of his own without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.</p> <p>The case was referred to James D. Colt, Esquire, as master. Upon the filing of the master’s report, the plaintiff moved that it be recommitted to the master for him to incorporate in the report further specified findings of fact. The motion was denied and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>An interlocutory decree confirming the report, and a final decree dismissing the bill then were entered by order of Hardy, J., and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
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