St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Hanks

<p>Appeal from Drew Circuit Court; Henry W. Wells, Judge;</p> <p>STATEMENT BY THE COURT.</p> <p>Appellee sued appellant in a justice’s court, alleging that appellant was a corporation; that he was employed by it on May 28, 1907, and was to be paid $108 per month, and that he continued in its employ until June 11, following, a period of fifteen days, when he was discharged and refused further employment by the appellant. That there was due him at the time of his discharge $54, and that he asked that the money or a valid check be be sent to him at Monticello, Arkansas, a station of the defendant at which an agent was kept. That check was not sent as requested, and that the said sum has never been paid him, and is still due and unpaid. That, by the failure to send the money or a valid check within seven days after his discharge, the wages of -the plaintiff continued -for sixty days at the contract rate, or $216; that nothing has been paid thereon, and the same is due and owing. And plaintiff prayed judgment for $270, with interest from the time same became due.</p> <p>Appellee adduced evidence to show that he was employed by appellant to serve in the capacity of station agent at Monticello, Ark.; that he worked for appellant fifteen days, and was to receive for his wages the sum of $52.50; that after he was discharged he made written demand on appellant’s superintendent for his wages, wrote him three times; that he asked the station agent at Monticello to send in his time. Appellee introduced the following letter:</p> <p>“Memphis, Tenn., Sept. 23, 1907.</p> <p>“Mr. J. G. Lorton, Supt.,</p> <p>“Monroe, La.</p> <p>“Dear Sir:</p> <p>“Enclosed please find voucher No. 5457 for $19.80 in favor of myself for services rendered at Monticello, Arkansas, in the absence of O. J. Lindsay, agent, account of sickness. I cannot accept this amount for my service, as I was running the station while the agent was sick. Your division agent, Mr. Wright, stated that he would see that I was

<p>Appeal from Izard Circuit Court; John W. Mrrks, Judge;</p> <p>1. The appellant was not responsible for the negligence or wrongful acts of an independent contractor. 53 Ark. 503; 55 Ark. 510.</p> <p>2. It was error to admit testimony to establish a parol contract to fix the fences in time to make a crop. The deed could not be varied by parol evidence.</p> <p>3. The court admitted improper testimony as to the value of the crop. For measure of damages, see 56 Ark. 612.</p> <p>1. Land outside of the right of way was taken and appropriated to the use of the appellant in the construction of its roadway ; hence the company, and not- the contractor, was liable for the damage. Elliott on Railroads, § 1063. It is liable for the consequent destruction of the fence. Ib. And for making roads on the land. Ib.</p> <p>2. The agreement to fix the fence in time to protect the crop was contemporaneous with, and a part of the consideration for, the making of the deed, and parol evidence was admissible to prove it. 55 Ark. 112; 27 Ark. 510; 128 Pa. 337; 138 Pa. 230; 156 Mass. 108.</p>

Buy and Sell Contract—Mineral Rights—Warranty Deed—Negligence—Breach of Contract—Statute of Limitations—Third Party—Cause of Action—Accrual Date. The Bells hired Orr Land Company LLC (Orr) and its employee Ellerman to represent them in selling their real property. Orr found a buyer and the Bells entered into a buy and sell contract with the buyer, which provided, as pertinent here, that the sale excluded all oil, gas, and mineral rights in the property. Orr then retained Land Title Guarantee Company (Land Title) to draft closing documents, including the warranty deed. In 2005 the Bells signed the warranty deed and sold the property to the buyer. The Bells didn't know that the warranty deed prepared by Land Title didn't contain any language reserving the Bells' mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. For over nine years, the Bells continued to receive the mineral owner's royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease on the property. In 2014 the lessee oil and gas company learned that the Bells didn't own the mineral rights, so it began sending the payments to the buyer. After that, the Bells discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. In 2016 the Bells filed this negligence and breach of contract action against defendants Land Title, Orr, and Ellerman. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bells' claims were untimely because the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Bells contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss because they sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish that the statute of limitations didn't begin to accrue on their claims until the oil and gas company ceased payment in September 2014, which is when they contended they discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights. A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years