Donna Radaszewski, Guardian, on Behalf of Eric Radaszewski v. Barry S. Maram, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid

CRCP 106(a)(4) —Rezoning Decision—Due Process—Spot Zoning. Plaintiffs Whitelaw, III and various neighbors (the neighbors) sought judicial review of the rezoning decision of defendant Denver City Council (the Council). Cedar Metropolitan LLC (Cedar) applied to rezone a 2.3-acre parcel. To build an "age-targeted" apartment complex on the site, Cedar sought to tear down a blighted church and rezone the parcel from single family home to a zone district that allowed three-story apartment buildings. The neighbors are property owners who live in the neighborhood near the parcel. They challenged the rezoning efforts, asserting it would hurt their property values, create traffic and parking problems, cause hazards to pedestrians, and degrade the character of the surrounding neighborhood. Following an eight-hour hearing, the Council granted the request to change the zoning. The neighbors challenged the rezoning in district court under CRCP 106(a)(4). The district court rejected all of their claims. On appeal, the neighbors asserted various claims, principally violation of their right to due process. They made five due process arguments. The Court of Appeals will affirm a rezoning decision unless the governmental entity exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, which occurs if the body misapplied the law or no competent evidence supports its decision. The neighbors first argued that a lobbyist for Cedar communicated before the hearing with Council member Susman, in whose district the parcel lies, through her private email account and by phone. They alleged that the failure to disclose these communications to the public before the hearing deprived them of their due process rights because they did not have notice and an opportunity to rebut the information on which the Council may have impermissibly relied in making its determination. Despite evidence of approximately 50 pages of such emails, the neighbors pointed to no evidence that they had a "substantial prejudicial

ASSAAD, 23 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA 2003) ID 3487 (PDF) (1) Case law of the United States Supreme Court holding, in the context of criminal proceedings, that there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel where there is no constitutional right to counsel does not require withdrawal from Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988), finding a right to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings, where the United States Courts of Appeals have recognized that a respondent has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing, which may be denied if counsel prevents the respondent from meaningfully presenting his or her case. (2) The respondent did not establish that his former counsel’s failure to file a timely appeal constituted sufficient prejudice to warrant consideration of his late appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

<p>APPEAL from District Court, Canyon County.</p> <p>If the title to an act actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces, two different objects, when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as' void from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between the two, and holding the act valid as to one and void as to the other. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, sec. 148, p. 178; Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383.) “The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state.” (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 172; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; State v. Pollock,-19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 834; Stewart v. Father Matthew Society, 41 Mich. 72, 1 N. W. 931; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. 297; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 352; State v. Ransom, 73 Mo. 78; People v. Pills, 35 N. Y. 452; State v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, 12 Pac. 708.) Almost any legitimate enterprise, whether it is a banking association or an irrigation association, is indirectly a benefit to the public, but this is not the sense in which the term is used in reference to taking private property for public use. (Savings etc. Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 455; In re Pequest River, 41 N. J. L. 175.) However salutary a law may be considered in its ultimate objects, unless in its' enforcement there is a method provided for the assessment according to benefits, it cannot under our laws be considered as constitutional. Unless such a provision is made, it will be considered as taking the property without due process of law. No rule of law is better established than that in making special assessments for any purpose, they must be accordin

Juvenile court grant of permanent custody of children to children services agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and did not violate due process where there was competent credible evidence to support the court's determination that granting custody was in the best interest of the children and appellant did not challenge the court's determination that the children had been in the agency's custody for twelve or more months in a consecutive twenty-two-month period. Juvenile court did not commit plain error by failing to appoint separate counsel for one of the children where record reflected that child was of young age and had an intellectual disability, and evidence did not indicate that child expressed strong, consistent desire to return to parent's custody. Appellant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to object to in camera interview, introduction of psychologist's reports, or alleged hearsay testimony because appellant failed to establish a reasonable probability that result of proceeding would have been different if counsel had taken these actions.