Friedman v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.

<p>Appeal from St. Charles Circuit Court. — Eon. J. B. Barnett, Judge.</p> <p>(1) Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court should have been sustained. The construction placed upon the Missouri statutes by the lower court renders them unconstitutional and void in denying’ to the defendant the equal protection of the laws. County v. Railroad, 118 IT. S. 394; Railroad v. Ellis, 165 IT. S. 150; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375; State v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 288; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Hammond Co. v. Best, 91 Me. 431. (2) Plaintiff’s petition is fatally defective in that it fails to set out enough of the article complained of to enable the court to understand the sense in which the language so set out was used, and the demurrer and motion in arrest should, therefore, have been sustained. Townshend on Libel, sec. 334; Odgers on Libel (4 Ed.), 581; Cartwright v. Wright, 5 B. & A. 615; Rutherford v. Evans, 6 Bingham, 451. There being no matters of “inducement” alleged in the petition — no allegation that plaintiff was in fact either an owner, or a stockholder, or managing officer of the corporation owner — both the petition and the proofs are in this respect fatally defective. Havemeyer V. Puller, 60 How. Prac. 320; Püb. Co. v. Journal Co., 108 Mo. App. 232; Legg v. Dunleavy, 80 Mo. 558; Crystal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 367; McManus v. Jackson, 28 Mo. 56; Bundy v. Hart, 46 Mo. 460; Kenworthy v. Journal Co., 117 Mo. App. 327; Flowers v. Smith, 214 Mo. 132; Hatfield v. Sisson, 59 N. Y. Supp. 73. (3) It was admitted that the “owner” of the Delmar Race Track was a corporation. As a corporation must necessarily act through its officers and agents, this article can only mean that those managing officers and agents of the corporation, who were personally in control of said track about the 22d of June, 1905, were, in the opinion of the Attorney-General, guilty of a felony. As it was admitted that plaintiff was in Europe at that time, this article could not have been libelo

<p>Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — lion. John A. Talty, Judge.</p> <p>(1) Tbe court below erred in instructing tbe jury to find for plaintiff on tbe issue of libel or no libel, only tbe fact of publication being admitted, tbe jury thus being deprived of tbe power to render a general verdict on that issue of libel or no libel. Art. II, sec, 14, Constitution; Odgers on Slander' and Libel (2 Ed.), p. 468; Bayles v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 920; Cox v. Lee, L. R. 4 Excb. 288; Parmiter v. Ooupland, 6 M. & W. 105; Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395; Arnold v. Jewett, 125 Mo. 241; Cooley on Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 564; 2 Greenl. on Evid. (15. Ed.), 411; Usher v. Severance, 20 Me. 11; Drake v. State, 20 Atl. Eep. 46; Goodrich v. Davis, 11 Met. (Mass.) 473. (2) A peremptory instruction to find for plaintiff in an action for libel, where only the fact of publication is admitted, is not only violative of the express provision of the Bill of Eights, but in effect makes the practice in libel cases what it was in England under Lord Mansfield, when it was found necessary to enact the Fox Libel Act in 1792. See argument of Thos. Erskin in Dean of St. Asaph’s case. Also argument of Hamilton and opinion of Kent, J., in People v. Oroswell, 3 Johnson’s cases, 337. State v. Allen, 1 McCord (S. C.), 626; State v. Syphrett, 27 S. C. 29; Drake v. State, 20 Atl. Eep. 746; Cooley on Const. Lim. (6 Ed.) 564-567; Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540. The jury find the law in the issue of “libel or no libel,” “under the direction,” but not under the compulsion of the court. Hazy v. 'Waith, 23 Colo. 556; State v. Powell, 66 Mo. App. 598. (3) This error of the court in peremptorily directing a verdict on the issue of libel or no libel was not cured by giving an instruction telling the jury at the same time that they were the judges of that issue. It was simply a case of absolutely contradictory instructions. Stone v. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475; Henchen v. C’Bannon, 56 Mo.

<p>Appeal, No. 340, Jan. T., 1892, by defendants, James M. Place and Rufus R. Wilson, from judgment of Q. S. Schuylkill Co., March T.; 1891, No. 175, on indictment for libel.</p> <p>Indictment for libel.</p> <p>The indictment set forth the following publication:</p> <p>“ ’Tis the talk of the town.” “ The racy sensation now exciting the Pottsville people. The woman is married, so is the ‘ man who has suddenly gone south for his health, accompanied by his spouse. What rumor has to say about it.”</p> <p>‘‘ Pottsville, Pa., January 24th. Never in Pottsville’s history has she been so excited over a scandal, as that which has been brought to light through the enterprise of the ‘ Pennsylvania Telegram; ’ imperfect as the details were, the people seemed to recognize at once that the town was becoming something of a city, so far as racy doings were concerned, than the most fastidious roué could have wished.</p> <p>“The Womelsdorf — Moyer story has not been half told. There have been all sorts of rumors afloat, but all efforts to get the interested parties to talk have failed. Though it certainly would not have come to the public gaze if they had not done too much talking in the first place. It now appears the lady is married. She was married in a home prepared for her and elegantly furnished by a lover, who thought he had been the sole participant in her secret love. At that wedding the o.) rriage of the girl’s employer played a prominent part. Horses, carriage, coachman and employer’s wife and son were at the wedding. The preacher was brought in another cab. Pretty high toned wedding for a young man, who only three months before was said to be on his uppers because he lost his last ten dollars at the Oresona races, when a man with a little black ball and the halves of an English walnut shell pulled in the multitude.</p> <p>“ Your reporter approached this unhappy young man. He refused to talk. He said that there was not a bit of truth in the stories. He said he did not inten