Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon

The defendant H filed a complaint with the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging discrimination in housing because of race against the defendant C, her neighbor in a condominium complex. C was defaulted in the underlying administrative proceeding. At the hearing in damages, the plaintiff commission requested $75,000 in com- pensatory damages. The human rights referee of the defendant Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities awarded H, inter alia, $15,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. The plaintiff commission filed a request for the referee to reconsider her decision, which request was deemed denied after the referee failed to take further action. The plaintiff commission then appealed the referee's decision, claiming, pri- marily, that the damages awarded were insufficient. The trial court remanded the matter for further consideration of damages in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co. (304 Conn. 679). On remand, the referee issued a final decision that did not change the amount of the damages awarded. The administrative appeal was then argued before the trial court, which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the referee's decision. On the plaintiff commis- sion's appeal to this court, held that the referee did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in her decision and the trial court did not abuse its discre- tion in dismissing the plaintiff commission's appeal and affirming the referee's decision: neither the referee nor the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied Patino in the determination of emotional distress dam- ages, as Patino did not establish a presumptive or mandatory range of damages for emotional distress claims but merely addressed a general range that such claims typically merit, references to that range in other cases did not establish any binding principle pertaining to damage awards in emotional distress actions, the fact that the emotional distress damag

The intervening plaintiff C filed a complaint with the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging discrimination in housing against the defendant. The commission filed a complaint in the trial court, claiming that the defendant had engaged in a prohibited discrimi- natory housing practice pursuant to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1) and (3)) by denying C an opportunity to rent or view a rental property and making discriminatory statements about C's ability to rent the property on the basis of a lawful source of income, a voucher pursuant to section 8 of the National Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 1437f). The defendant, who had told C that the property was not ''section 8 ready,'' also claimed that C's credit score, which C had reported as ''fair,'' did not meet her requirements. The court rendered judgment in favor of the commission and C, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant violated subdivisions (1) and (3) of § 46a-64c (a): a. There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant had engaged in a prohibited discriminatory housing practice pursuant to § 46a-64c (a) (1): testimony by a previous tenant that he did not provide the defendant with his credit score prior to viewing the property supported the court's finding that the defendant did not have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to show C the rental property; moreover, this court declined to review the defen- dant's unpreserved challenge to documentary evidence from individuals who had posed as prospective tenants to determine whether her actions toward C were legally actionable and testimony related to those prospec- tive tenants, as she did not make any objections to that evidence or testimony during the trial, and this court declined to assess the weight of the documentary evidence

Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-293 (a)), an injured employee may assert a claim against and recover damages from a tortfeasor who is allegedly liable for the employee's work-related injury, even if the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for that injury, and an employer that has paid or has become obligated to pay those benefits to the employee "shall have a lien upon any judgment . . . or any settlement received by the employee from the [tortfeasor]." The plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate and as the decedent's surviving spouse, had filed for workers' compensation benefits after the decedent died of mesothelioma, which was caused in substantial part by his exposure to products containing asbestos during the course of his employ- ment with the defendants, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the town of Manchester. Prior to filing her claims for benefits, the plaintiff settled numerous product liability actions that she had brought against the manu- facturers and suppliers of the products containing asbestos to which the decedent had been exposed, with 70 percent of the net settlement proceeds awarded to the decedent's estate as damages for his personal injuries and death, and 30 percent of the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff for her loss of consortium. With respect to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, an administrative law judge of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, both at home and during the course of his employment with the defendants, was a significant factor in causing the decedent to develop mesothelioma. Because the decedent's meso- thelioma was caused in substantial part by this exposure to asbestos during his employment, total incapacity benefits were awarded to the decedent's estate and survivor's benefits were awarded to the plaintiff. The administra- tive law judge determined, however, that the defendants, as the decedent's e

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no