Connecticut Department of Correction

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the respondent Commissioner of Correction had provided him with inadequate treat- ment for certain medical conditions that constituted deliberate indiffer- ence to his medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal, as the court expressly credited the testimony of the respondent's medical expert, who opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the petitioner had received adequate medical treatment, as well that of the petitioner's treating physician, in finding that the petitioner had received medically appropriate treatment, and this court, on appeal, would not second- guess those credibility determinations. Argued September 19—officially released October 25, 2022

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the Department of Correction violated his constitutional rights to procedural due process in assigning him a certain sex treatment need score and to substantive due process in classifying him as a sex offender, even though he never had committed or been convicted of a sex offense. The petitioner had been convicted of unlawful restraint in the first degree and failure to appear, and had been found to be in violation of probation. Prior to the petitioner's incarceration, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to a charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship after the petitioner's wife, M, recanted her statement to the police that the peti- tioner had sexually assaulted her during the same incident that formed the basis for the charges of which he was convicted. Following his release from incarceration, the petitioner pleaded guilty to new charges stemming from another incident and was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration. Upon his return to prison, the petitioner was notified that a classification hearing would be held to determine whether, on the basis of the prior charge of sexual assault in a spousal relationship, he would be assigned a sex treatment need score of greater than 1 and that, in making its determination, the department would be relying on the police report of the petitioner's arrest and the petitioner's Connecti- cut rap sheets. Prior to the hearing, the department denied the petition- er's requests that, at his hearing, he be permitted to present live witness testimony and to be represented by counsel. During the hearing, the petitioner denied sexually assaulting M and submitted several docu- ments, including M's letter recanting her statement to the police, in support of his denial. Following the hearing, the hearing officer, T, notified the petitioner that she had assigned him a sex treatment need score of 3, that, in arriving at her decision, she reviewed not

The petitioner, who had been convicted of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, misconduct with a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner contended that she was prejudiced by counsel's responses to evidence of her blood alcohol content and consciousness of guilt in connection with a motor vehicle collision that killed the occupants of a vehicle that was struck by the petitioner's vehicle. The petitioner had consumed alcohol at a party prior to the accident. A paramedic at the accident scene drew and labeled five tubes of the petitioner's blood, which were placed in a biohazard bag and taken with the petitioner in an ambulance to a hospital. Each of the tubes had a different colored cap. A computer in the hospital's laboratory scanned the tubes and printed labels that identified the test to be performed on each tube of blood. After a hearing outside the jury's presence, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion to exclude the blood alcohol content evidence. W, a laboratory director at the hospital, then testified that a printout from the laboratory's com- puter had indicated that the type of tube normally used to test blood alcohol content had a cap that was different in color from the caps on the five tubes that were in the biohazard bag. The petitioner's counsel thereafter did not renew his motion to exclude the blood alcohol content evidence on chain of custody grounds. The state also offered conscious- ness of guilt evidence that, shortly after the accident, the petitioner had executed a quitclaim deed transferring her one-half interest in her home to her mother. Defense counsel objected unsuccessfully to the admission of that evidence on the ground that, although evidence of a transfer of property to shield assets from recovery may be admissible in a civil case as pro

The plaintiff inmate appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant D, a commissary operator at the correctional facility in which the plaintiff was incarcer- ated. The plaintiff brought an action against D in his individual and official capacities, claiming under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) that D violated his rights under the first amendment by denying his application to work in the prison commissary in retaliation for claims the plaintiff previously had filed against other Department of Correction employees. The plaintiff further alleged that D discriminated against him on the basis of race in employment assignments and violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment by misappropriating from inmate trust accounts the interest earned on inmates' Social Security benefits. The plaintiff had been employed in the prison commissary in 2006 until he was given a disciplinary citation and his employment was terminated, which he did not dispute. More than seven years later, he applied for an assignment in the commissary, but was denied by D because of the prior termination. At the time the plaintiff's application was denied, the prison had a written policy that provided that, for an inmate to be eligible to work in the commissary, he must have not been previously terminated from a com- missary position. The trial court dismissed the first two counts of the plaintiff's complaint, in which he sought money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against D in his individual capacity. The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because sovereign immunity barred those claims. The court rendered summary judgment on the plaintiff's remaining claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a)) or to seek permission from the Claims Commissioner, pursuant to statute (§§ 4-141 through 4-165) to sue the state. On appeal, the p

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim inside the victim's home during what appeared to be a botched burglary, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the state deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial insofar as it failed to correct the trial testimony of L, a former director of the state police forensic laboratory, that a red substance on a towel found in the victim's home after the murder tested positive for blood when no such test had been conducted and when subsequent testing conducted in connection with the present habeas action revealed that the red substance was not in fact blood. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. With respect to the petitioner's due process claim, the court concluded that, because L mistakenly but honestly believed that the towel tested positive for blood and, thus, did not give perjured testimony, the burden was on the petitioner to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of a different verdict if the correct evidence had been disclosed. Applying this standard, the habeas court determined that L's testimony was immaterial because, among other things, the state's criminal case against the petitioner did not rely on forensic evidence but, rather, on the testimony of numerous lay witnesses. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed, claiming that the habeas court applied the incorrect standard for determining whether the petitioner was entitled to a new trial and that, upon application of the correct standard, which required the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that L's incorrect testimony was immaterial, he was entitled to a new trial. Held that, on the basis of this court's analysis in the companion case of State v. Henning (334 Conn. 1), this court concluded that the state's failure to correct L's incorrect testimony that there was bl