In re Jaelynn K.-M.

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child, W. W was born in Guatemala and immigrated to New Haven in 2018 with the respondent father. In 2019, following a sexual assault by a family member, W was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. From mid-2019 through December, 2021, the Department of Children and Families had limited and sporadic contact with the mother, who remained in Guatemala, and between December, 2021, and August, 2022, the mother did not respond to communications from the department. The mother immigrated to New Haven in July, 2022. The department was unaware of this until August, 2022, when the mother appeared, unannounced, at a supervised visit between W and the father. Thereafter, the department referred the mother to various services, with which she was reluctant to engage until early 2023. Trial on the termination of parental rights petition commenced in March, 2023. The petitioner ini- tially alleged that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (D)), no ongoing parent-child relationship existed between the mother and W. At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the petitioner's counsel orally moved to amend the petition to add the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate as to the mother, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), ''to conform to the proof elicited at trial.'' In the absence of any objection or request for a continuation, the trial court granted the motion and, thereafter, terminated the respondents' parental rights, determining, inter alia, that the petitioner proved that the mother had failed to rehabili- tate but not that an ongoing parent-child relationship between the mother and W did not exist. Held: 1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that she was denied her due process right to the effective assistance of counsel

The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, sought to termi- nate the respondents' parental rights with respect to their minor child. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial on the termination petition was held remotely via Microsoft Teams. The respondent mother was represented by counsel and participated in the proceedings by telephone. The respondent father consented to termination. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered judgment terminating the respondents' parental rights. On the respondent mother's appeal, held that, pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the record was inadequate to review the mother's claim that, by requiring her to participate in a virtual trial to terminate her parental rights without providing her with an electronic device that allowed her to appear before the court in the same manner as if she were on trial in a courtroom, she was denied due process of law and equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution: although the parties agreed that the mother participated via telephone outside the proximity of her counsel, the record was silent as to whether the mother chose to turn her video off or whether she was unable to participate via video as a result of inadequate technology; moreover, other than one connectivity issue during the mother's canvass, there was no indication that she had diffi- culty hearing or participating at the trial, and the trial court repeated the canvass after being advised of the connectivity issue; furthermore, the mother did not ask for any technical assistance or accommodation during the trial; accordingly, the situation was analogous to that set forth in In re Vada V. (343 Conn. 730), in that the trial court was unable to assess any potential problems with the mother's ability to participate via video and had no occasion to consider alternative means for her to participate, to provide her with technology or Internet access, or to

CRCP 106(a)(4) —Rezoning Decision—Due Process—Spot Zoning. Plaintiffs Whitelaw, III and various neighbors (the neighbors) sought judicial review of the rezoning decision of defendant Denver City Council (the Council). Cedar Metropolitan LLC (Cedar) applied to rezone a 2.3-acre parcel. To build an "age-targeted" apartment complex on the site, Cedar sought to tear down a blighted church and rezone the parcel from single family home to a zone district that allowed three-story apartment buildings. The neighbors are property owners who live in the neighborhood near the parcel. They challenged the rezoning efforts, asserting it would hurt their property values, create traffic and parking problems, cause hazards to pedestrians, and degrade the character of the surrounding neighborhood. Following an eight-hour hearing, the Council granted the request to change the zoning. The neighbors challenged the rezoning in district court under CRCP 106(a)(4). The district court rejected all of their claims. On appeal, the neighbors asserted various claims, principally violation of their right to due process. They made five due process arguments. The Court of Appeals will affirm a rezoning decision unless the governmental entity exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, which occurs if the body misapplied the law or no competent evidence supports its decision. The neighbors first argued that a lobbyist for Cedar communicated before the hearing with Council member Susman, in whose district the parcel lies, through her private email account and by phone. They alleged that the failure to disclose these communications to the public before the hearing deprived them of their due process rights because they did not have notice and an opportunity to rebut the information on which the Council may have impermissibly relied in making its determination. Despite evidence of approximately 50 pages of such emails, the neighbors pointed to no evidence that they had a "substantial prejudicial