Mills v. Statewide Grievance Committee

The plaintiff, a candidate for town council in the November, 2025 South Windsor municipal election, appealed from the trial court's judgment dis- missing his action brought pursuant to the statutes (§§ 9-328 and 9-371b) affording a candidate who is aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with a municipal election or referendum, respectively, expe- dited judicial review of his or her claims. In the November, 2025 municipal election, South Windsor electors approved, by way of referendum, several revisions to the South Windsor charter, one of which changed the maxi- mum number of individuals affiliated with a particular political party who could serve on the nine member town council from six individuals to a bare majority of five. During that election, electors also voted for town council candidates, with six Democratic Party candidates receiving more votes than any Republican Party candidate. The plaintiff received the sixth highest vote total of the Democratic candidates, and B received the fourth highest vote total of the Republican candidates. Following the election, the defendant, the South Windsor town clerk, determined that the bare majority charter revision, as approved in the referendum, applied to the 2025 town council election, even though the minutes from a meeting of the South Windsor Charter Revision Commission at which the commission proposed the bare majority charter revision indicated that the revision, if approved, would not take effect until the November, 2027 South Windsor municipal election. The town clerk thereupon issued a preliminary list of election winners, declaring that B, rather than the plaintiff, had won the final seat on the town council. The plaintiff claimed in the trial court that he was aggrieved by the town clerk's decision to apply the bare majority charter revision in determining which candidates had won the November, 2025 town council election. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's ac

The petitioner, who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of a pizza delivery driver, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the defense theory was that another individual, D, with whom the petitioner was visiting on the night of the shooting, had committed the charged offenses, but D testified that it was the petitioner who had made plans to rob a delivery driver and who had used D's cell phone to call and case various businesses, including the pizza restaurant that employed the victim. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate D's cell phone records, a majority of that court ultimately concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by C's deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's determination on the issue of prejudice. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice stemming from C's failure to investigate D's cell phone records, as there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's failure to undertake such an investigation and to introduce some or all of the records at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the peti- tioner's guilt, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction that the habeas court grant the habeas petition, vacate his convictions, and order a new trial. The

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's partial judgment in favor of N Co., the plaintiff's automobile insurer. The plaintiff had brought an action against the defendant L, seeking damages for, inter alia, diminution of value and loss of use of his vehicle in connection with an automobile accident allegedly caused by L's negligence. Thereafter, L impleaded N Co. and alleged that his insurer, S Co., had tendered to N Co. $25,000, which was the full liability coverage limit for property damage under L's insurance policy, based on N Co.'s alleged misrepresentation that the plaintiff had been made whole. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, alleging, inter alia, that N Co. was unjustly enriched when it prematurely accepted the $25,000 from S Co. and thereby reduced the amount of funds that otherwise would have been available to indemnify L in the plaintiff's negligence action, in violation of the make whole doctrine, which restricts an insurer's ability to enforce its right to subrogation until after the insured has been fully compensated, or made whole, for the insured's loss. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against N Co. as not ripe for adjudication. In affirming the trial court's partial judgment of dismissal, the Appellate Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim was not ripe until the plaintiff first obtained a judgment against L because that claim was otherwise contingent on whether and to what extent the plaintiff could recover from L and on L's ability to satisfy the hypothetical judgment. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that his unjust enrichment claim was ripe for adjudication. Held: The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim on ripeness grounds, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (1)), if a respondent attorney has been disciplined at least three times in a five year period preceding the date of the filing of a grievance complaint that gives rise to a finding of current misconduct, the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee ''shall direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the Superior Court,'' and ''[t]he sole issue to be determined by the court upon the presentment shall be the appropriate action to take'' as a result of the nature of the respondent's current misconduct ''and the cumulative discipline issued concerning the respondent within such five year period.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (2)), ''[i]f the respondent has appealed the issuance of a finding of misconduct made by the Statewide Grievance Committee or the reviewing committee, the court shall first adjudi- cate and decide that appeal in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (d) through (f) of [§] 2-38 [of the Practice Book].'' The respondent attorney appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judg- ment suspending him from the practice of law for ninety days. A 2018 grievance complaint alleging certain professional misconduct by the respon- dent was referred to a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, but hearings on the matter were postponed for nearly three years. The respondent ultimately moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that he had been denied his right to due process and prejudiced by the delay in its adjudication. Following a hearing in 2021, the reviewing commit- tee denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and found that he had engaged in certain misconduct. The reviewing committee ultimately concluded that the respondent's misconduct warranted a reprimand but that it was required by Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1) to direct